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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
TIJE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BONNEVILLE COUNTY
GREGORY PAUL BARRETT,
Plaintiff,
VS.
ANN MARIE B A m T T ,
Defendant.
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Case No. CV-05-4852
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON
PROPERTY AND DEBT
DIVISION AND ATTORNEYS
FEES

BACKGROUND
1.

On July 3, 2007, the court issued its "Decree of Divorce;" on August 30,

2007, the court issued its "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 011 Grounds for
Divorce, Child Custody and Child Support" and its "Order on Grounds for Divorce,
Child Custody and Child Support and Rule 54(b) Certificate." On September 10, 2007,
the court and counsel met infor~nallyin chambers for a conference on a few property
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issues. In this doculllent, the court inaltes its findings of fact and conclusions of law on
the re~nainingissues in this case.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON
ISSUES OF PROPERTY AND DEBT
2.

Idaho Code 9 32-903 states:

All property of either the husband or the wife owned by him or her
before marriage, and that acquired afterward by either by [sic] gift, bequest,
devise, or descent, or that which either he or she shall acquire with the
proceeds of his or her separate property, by way of rnoneys or other
property, shall remain his or her separate property.
3.

The court finds that the party shown below owned the following property

before marriage or acquired it afterward directly by---or using the proceeds of-gift,
bequest, devise, or descent:
Gregory's Separate Property
Description
Comments
Greg's recliner
Church related books Gregory owned Stipulation
before marriage
Real property at 3580 Mobile Drive
Stipulation
(Singlewide)
Property identified as Gregory's
Stipulation
separate property in the parties'
written Stipulation (Defendant's
Exhibit M)
Debt owing to Bonneville County for See Plaintiffs Exhibit 26.
property taxes on 3580 E. Mobile
$6,296 reimnbursement claim against
See explanation below.
i
coinmunity estate for separate
property contribution to purchase of
681 Katie Court
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Ann's Separate Property

1 Cnmments
1 Stipulation

Descrintion

1 Four horses (Stormy, Cherokee,
__Misty,Shadow, ~ i g e r )
Piano
rra~npoline
Extra long log chain
Movies: Air Bud, Beethoven I & 11,
Lion King I & I1
Church related books Ann owned
before marriage
Property
.
. identified as Ann's separate
1 -property
- .in the parties' written Stipulation (De^fendantrsExhibit M)
6/13 interest in mobile home located
. -.
.
.
. Bandsaw

Stipulation
Stipulation
Stipulation
Stipulation

I Stioulation

I Stipulation

I

I

Gift

Idaho Code 5 32-906 states:

All other property acquired after ~narriageby either husband or wife
is community property.

5.

At trial, both parties stipulated that the court should make an equal division

of their colnmuliity property and debts.
6.

1

I Stipulatio~z

,---2

4.

1

The court finds that the parties acquired the following property during the

marriage by mealis other than gift, bequest, devise, or descent, and that none of the listed
property represents proceeds fioin separate property. The court also fiiids that the parties
incurred the following debts during the marriage. The court finds that the following
property is colntnunity property, that the following values are the fair market values of
each listed item, that the following debts are colnlnunity debts, and that the division

.
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indicated below is substantially equal. The court will divide the colnrnunity property and
the responsibility for paying the coininunity debts as follows:
Comments
When Ann and Kevin Spencer
divorced in April 1996, the Lincoln
County Wyoining divorce court
awarded to Ann this real estate in Star
Valley, Wyoining that the parties call
the "Etna property."
When Ann and Gregoly married,
Ann owed $123,961 on a debt to
Countrywide Home Loans secured by
the Etna property. During the
marriage of An11 and Gregory, the
parties made payments on that debt,
and by August 12, 1999, they had
reduced the balance by $2,141 to
$121,820. Ann made the lnonthly
payments on the debt to Countrywide
Mortgage froin her checking account.
Into that account, she deposited the
monthly child support she received
from Kevin Spencer, the rental income
she received froin her separate
properties, and $350 to $400 Gregory
provided each inonth froin his
ernployinent income.
On August 12, 1999, Ann sold a
portion of the property (about 2.5
acres) and a inobile home to Eric and
Dawn Loveland for $88,500. To close
on that sale, Ann had to pay off the
existing mortgage debt owing to
Countrywide. To pay that debt, she
and Gregory borrowed $34,512 from

Description
Real property in
Etna. Wvoining'

I

This item excludes the proceeds fro111 the Wyoming 100 sale in the trust accourrt of Woolf, Co11lbo &
Tliompso~~
but includes ally other interest in the Wyomil~g100 contract for develop~ne~~t
ofthe Etna
property.
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the Bank of Star Valley (BSV), giving
a promissory note that they both
signed. Ann also signed a quitclairn
deed conveying the remaining Etna
acreage to "Ann Barrett and Gregory
Barrett, Wife and Husband as Tenants
by the Entireties," and then she and
Gregory signed a new mortgage in
favor of BSV, pledging the property tc
secure repayment of the $34,512 loan.
Ann signed all of the doculnents
(the deed to the Lovelands, the
quitclaim deed from Ann to Ann and
Gregory, and the prolnissory note and
mortgage to BSV) during the closing.
An11 testified that she signed the
quitclaim deed simply because it was
placed in front of her at the closing an1
was required for the new loan. She
testified that she would not have
signed the quitclaim deed had she
understood that she was giving
Gregory a half interest in the property.
Until the winter of 2003, Ann
made the monthly payments on the
debt to BSV from her checking
account. (As noted above, into that
account, Ann deposited the child
support she received from Kevin
Spencer and the monthly allowance
Gregory provided from his
elnployinent income.) In the winter of
2003, the parties started a joint
checking account, and Ann began
lnalcing the payrnents from that
account. The parties have now
reduced the debt by $11,63 1 to
$22,881.
Gregory contends that Ann's
signing the quitclaim deed transmuted
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the Etna real estate into colninunity
property; Ann concedes that the
community estate has a claim against
her separate estate for the $13,772
reduction in principal of the
Countrywide and BSV debts, but she
contends that the real estate remained
her separate property.
"[A] husband and wife may elect
at any time to change their property
rights." Stockdale v. Stockdale, 102
Idaho 870,873,643 P.2d 82,85 (Ct.
App. 1982). Accord, Suchan v.
Suchan, 106 Idaho 654,660,682 P.2d
607,613 (1984). Idaho Code § 32-915
allows spouses to transmute separate
property into coinlnunity property by
following certain formalities. It states:
"All contracts for marriage settlelnents
must be in writing, and executed and
acknowledged or proved in like
inanner as conveyances of land are
required to be executed and
aclcnowledged or proved." (A
conveyance of land requires an
"instrument in writing, subscribed by
the party creating, granting, assigning,
surrendering or declaring the same, or
by his lawhl agent thereunto
authorized by writing." Idaho Code $
9-503.) Here, the quitclaim deed
signed by Ann nleets the requirelnents
of Idaho Code 32-917.
When one spouse claims that
the other spouse intended to transmute
property or to ~naltea gift, the burden
is on the party making the claim to
prove the intent in question by clear
and convincing evidence. Ustick v.
Ustick, 104 1daho 215,222,657 P.2d

1
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1083, 1090 (1983). Generally, a
quitclaim deed executed with the
formalities required by Idaho Code $
32-917 is sufficient to meet that
burden of proof. See, e.g.,Bliss v.
Bliss, 127 Idaho 171,898 P.2d 1081
(1995); Hall v. Hall, 116 Idaho 483,
777 P.2d 255 (1989). "'Where the
language of a deed is plain and
unambiguous, the intention of the
parties nlust be determined from the
deed itself, and par01 evidence is not
admissible to show intent." Hall v.
Hall, I16 Idaho 483,484,777 P.2d
255,256 (1989). Accord, e.g., Bliss v.
Bliss, 127 Idaho 171,898 P.2d 1081
(1995). Here, the deed is plain and
unambiguous.
Ann notes that in Hoslcinson v.
Hoskinson, 139 Idaho 448,80 P.3d
1049 (2003), the Idaho Supreme Cour
affirmed the trial court's conclusion
that the wife had not proven
transmutation by clear and convincing
evidence even though the husband
signed a quitclaim deed conveying his
interest in the property to hiinself and
his wife. Hoslcinson, however, is
distinguishable from the present case.
In Hoslcinson, two deeds were signed
on the same day: the husband signed
one deed purporting to convey the
property to himself and the wife; the
wife signed the second deed conveying
the property to the husband. The
evidence did not establish which deed
was signed first. The deeds
contradicted each other. Because the
language of the deeds was not "plain
and unambi~uous."the court could no1
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"determine the intention of the parties
... froin tile deed itself." I-lall v. Hull,
116 Idaho 483,484,777 P.2d 255,25t
(1989). The ambiguity created by the
dual deeds justified the court's
considering parol evidence of the
parties' intent. See Hull v. Hull, supra
That parol evidence led the court to
find that the parties intended no
transmutatio~~.
I-lere, the deed shows no
ambiguity, and the court finds that it
transmuted the Etna real estate fronl
separate property to cornlnunity
property.
When the Lincoln County divorce
court awarded this property to Ann in
April 1996, it was worth about
$160,000. (Ann's equity was about
$34,000.) Ann and Gregory disagree
on the current fair inarket value of the
property.
The court received in evidence
Plaintiffs Exhibit 32, a September
2006 appraisal report by Thoinas Ogle,
a Certified General Real Estate
Appraiser; the court also heard
testimony hoin Mr. Ogle, Gregory anc
Ann. Gregory opined that Mr. Ogle
undervalued the property by failing to
give appropriate weight to a contract
relating to developlnent of the
property. (See footnote 2 below.) Mr.
Ogle testified that adding value for the
possible development would be undulj
speculative. Ann agreed; she opined
that the contract did add any value to
the property. Mr. Ogle was the only
expert witness to testify concerning the
fair inarket value.
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~ e c a u s ethe court has decided to awarc
the Etna property to the parties as
tenants in cornmon, the court need not
deterlniile the fair rnarltet value of tlie

to Bank of Star

Thompson

Real property at 278
/Contor (lot ($15000)

I
$67,000 1
I

See above.
In September 2005, the parties
sold a portion (about 2 acres) of the
Etna property to Wyoining 100, LLC
("Wyoming 100") for $50,000.2 The
proceeds were placed in the trust
account at Woolf, Co~nbo&
Thomnpson. (The parties agreed that
the sale would have no iinpact on
characterization of the Etna property a:
coininunity or separate. See
Defendant's Exhibit F.)
During the September 10, 2007
informal conference in chambers,
counsel agreed that the court should
place one-half of this fund in the
control of each party but that such
allocation would have no iinpact on
the characterization of the funds as
coinlnunity or separate property on
appeal.
Gregory bought this lot for $9,000
before marriage; he also owned a

As additional consideration, Wyorniilg 100 agreed to build a feiice and provide a mechanized pop-up
irrigation system. Wyoming 100 also agreed to pave up to 400 lineal feet of street and provide stubs for
water, power and telephone for a five-lot subdivisio~lon the parties' property. The contract required
Wyoini~ig100 to begiii co~~structio~i
by December 2006, but Wyo~niilg100 has not started any
develop~nelltyet; it is uncertain when developi~~ent
inight begiii.
To help illsure that the lots could be developed, Grego~yfiled an applicatioil to change the
highway access from agricultural to resideiltial. The parties also spent about $400 to replace a strip of
fence on tlie property; tlie evidence did not address whether that expenditure enhanced the value of the
propel*
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singlewide mobile home situated on
the lot. During the marriage, the
parties constructed a cement pad on th
lot, and on about November 29,2001,
they replaced the singlewide mobile
home with a doublewide mobile home
To buy the doublewide home, the
parties borrowed $3 1,152 from the
Bank of Commerce (BOC). Both
Gregory and Ann signed the
promissory note. The noted provided
that it would be secured by a deed of
trust on the mobile home. By making
monthly payments, the parties reducec
the BOC debt by $9,830 to $21,322.
On December 27,2004, tlie parties
borrowed $45,000 from Wells Fargo
Bank; both parties signed the
promissory note. They used $21,322
to pay off tlie BOC debt and they used
the remaining $26,000 to consolidate
other debts (vehicle loans). At or near
the closing on tlie Wells Fargo loan,
Gregory signed a quitclaim deed
conveying the property to "Gregory P.
Barrett and Ann Barrett, Husband and
Wife."
The parties stipulated that $67,00(
is the fair market value of this
property. (They attribute $52,000 to
the doublewide home and $15,000 to
the lot.) They also stipulated that the
court should award the property to
Gregory. They agree that if the court
decides that the property has remained
Gregory's separate property, tl~enthe
coln~nunityis entitled to a
reimbursement claim equal to 77.6%
of the propeily's value.
Ann is not necessarily claiming

and double wide
mobile home
($52000))
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Debt owing to Wells 1
Fargo secured by
property at 278 N.
Contor
Sale proceeds from 1
real property at 68 1
Katie Court3

"he

..

I

8593

1

(40166)

1

8593

1

$1,593 each party received in May 2007 is included

that this property is community
property, but she requests that the
court's ruling on this property to be
consistent with its ruling on the Etna
property.
Following the same reasoning the
court used in connection with the Etna
property, the court finds that the
Contor property is community
property.
See above. The parties agreed tha
Gregory would pay this debt; the coun
finds it is a corninunity debt.
This item represents the net
proceeds from the sale of certain real
property at 681 Katie Court. Thc
parties acquired that property during
marriage and agree that it is
community property. As explained
below, however, the parties invested
some of Gregory's separate property ii
the Katie Court property.
Accordingly, Gregory's separate estatr
is entitled to reimbursement as
explained below.
Before his marriage to Ann,
Gregory owned certain realty the
parties called the "Tennis Court
Property." To buy the Tennis Court
property, Gregory borrowed $96,500
from Wells Fargo Bank. He made
monthly payments on that debt, and
when the parties married, he owed
$96,147. The parties continued
making monthly payments during the
marriage and reduced the debt by an

it1 the

amounts listed. See Plaintiffs Exhibit
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additional $5,230 to $90,917. The
parties also improved the property
using community labor and funds; the
parties stipulated that those
inlprovetnents enhanced the property'>
value by $3,000.
On November 18,2002, Gregory
sold the Tennis Court property. Ile
paid off the Wells Fargo debt with the
proceeds, and he received a net cash
payment.of $14,526. From that hnd,
the co~ninunityestate was entitled to
reimbursement totaling $8,230
(representing the $5,230 reduction in
mortgage debt and the $3,000
enl~ancemelltfrom the ilnprovements).
The balance, $6,296, remained
Gregory's separate property.
From the sale proceeds, the parties
spent $ t ,526 on colnlnunity expenses
not specifically identified in the
evidence. Accordingly, the
community portion of the sale
proceeds was reduced to $6,704.
The parties invested the remaining
$13,000-$6,296 of Gregory's
separate property and $6,704 in
colnlnunity property-in the real estate
at 681 Katie Court.
The parties lived at the Katie
Courl property for several years. A
few weeks before the trial in this
matter, they sold the Katie Court
property, realizing net proceeds of
$17,186.
From the net proceeds, the
colnmunity must pay Gregory's $6,296
claim for rei~nburselnentto his
separate estate.

1
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Debt owing to
Gregory's separate
estate for
reimbursement claiin
on 681 Katie Court
sale
Real property located
at 140 N. Adain (lot
($15000) and double
wide mobile hoine
($52,000))

Debt owing to
GMAC secured by
real property at 140
N. Adam
Debt owing to
Bonneville County
for property tax on
140 N. Adain
Mobile hoine located
at 181 N. Adam
Debt owing to
Bonneville County
for property taxes on
181 N. Ada111
Mobile home located
in Thayne, Wyoming

each took $1,593 froin the communiQ
proceeds in May 1997.
During the September 10,2007
informal conference in chambers,
counsel agreed that the court should
place one-half of this fund in the
control of each party but that such
allocation would have no impact on
the parties' positions or arguments on
appeal.
(3 148) See above.

67000

Ann has been living at this
residence since October 2005 and
would like the court to award it to her.
Gregory does not care whether the
court awards it to him or to Ann,
unless an award is needed to
acco~nplishan equal division of
property.

(21843)

See Plaintiffs Exhibit 26.

(175)

4000
(58)

4308

Stipulation
See Plaintiffs Exhibit 26.

This property includes only the
inobile home and not the land on
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which it sits.
The parties agree that 7113 of the
value of this property is colnlnunity
property and 6113 of the value is Ann'
separate property.
The parties do not agree on the fa
inarlcet value of this property. Neithel
party presented any expert testimony
to establish the value.
Froin conflicting evidence, the
court finds that the fair market value i;
$8,000. The court notes that this is an
older singlewide trailer; Ann testified
that the roof leaks, the trailer is in
"rough shape," and it is not on a
foundation. The parties paid only
$7,000 for the mobile home.
The parties agreed at trial that the
court should award this rental propert!
to Gregory at a value of $7,500. Late1
however, Gregory testified that shortl:
before the trial, he incurred a debt of
about $2,000 to seal the floor and
replace the carpeting and then rerented the property at a higher rate.
(The parties stipulated that Gregory
could provide the bills for the
carpeting and sealing after trial; he has
not done so.) Gregory then asked the
court to characterize the debt as a
coininunity debt.
Since Gregory incurred the debt
during the parties' marriage, the court
assumes that it was a colnlnunity debt.
Simplot v. Siinplot, 96 Idaho 239, 526
P.2d 844 (1974).
Gregory did not consult Ann
before sealing and carpeting the floor;
he made the improvements after the
parties had agreed the court would
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Debt owing for
expenses at 805 N.
Stevens
Debt owing to
Bonneville County
for property taxes on
805 N. Stevens
1998 Toyota Tacoma
truck
Children's videos

Half food storage
Half food storage
Set of dining chairs
Silver mirror in
master bedroom
Mirror in the
basement
Tools (including but
not limited to
shovels, rakes, hoes,
fence pliers, fann
tools, etc.)
Baby jungle aniinal
picture in Shannon's
room
Cat and dog pictures
in Brittana's room

award the property to him.
Accordingly, awarding the property to
Gregory at a value of $7,500 and
requiring the comlnunity to pay the
$2,000 debt would result in a winafall
to Gregory. Instead, the court has
valued the property at $9,500 to reflecl
the i~nprovementsGregory lnade
before trial.
See above.

(78)

8425
1

1
1

1
600
40
75
200

15

See Plaintiffs Exhibit 26.

Stipulation
Based on the parties' stipulation,
Ann will pick out 6 more videos, and
Gregory will send them to her.
Stipulation
Stipulation
Stipulation
Stipulation
Stipulation
Based on the parties' stipulation, il
appears the parties have already
divided these items, and Gregory
received $200 more in value than Ann
received.
Stipulation

,
20

Stipulation

25

Stipulation

FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS ON P R O P M Y , DEBT & FEES
i

a

i

15

Oalcridge furniture
1 plant stand from
Oakridge Furniture
Dogs on shelf picture
in Icacey's room
American shelfidkcor
by the front door in
the colnmunity home I
4 stone vases with
flowers
1 swivel roclcer
1 swivel roclcer
Boxes of sewing
scraps
Set of dishes (green
and white)
Plant stand in den
Greenery basket in
the living room
under the table
Shannon's jungle
print coinibrter sheet
2 silver wire baskets
in the master
bathroom
I
Mirror, ivy and
pictures located in
/the nlaster bedroom II
Unhung picture of
grapes and fruit with

Stipulation

25
15

Stipulation

50

Stipulation

1

170

( Stipulation

25

Stipulation
Stipulation
Sti~ulation

50

Stipulation

15

Stipulation
Stipulation

1
1

p
p

15

Stipulation

20

Stipulation

10
I

I

25

Stipulation

1I

1I

1

Stipulation

25

Stipulation

-

Picture in the
downstairs bathroom
Picture at the foot of
the stairs
2 pictures in the den
1 Ficus tree
1 Ficus tree
Flower arrangement

25
35
1
1
35

Stipulation
Stipulation
Stipulatioll
Stipulation
Stinulation
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above the mirror in
the fainily room
John Wayne nlovies

1

1

Community interest
in PERSI accounts
(Base plan and
Clioice plan)

Half

Half

Camcorder and
Ann's nail apron
wit11 haininer & tools
Half of food: Beans
& Peas

125

Based on the parties' stipulation,
Ann will pick out 6 inore videos, and
Gregory kill send them to her.
The parties stipulated at trial to
divide the cominuility interest in these
accounts equally by QDRO. (The
court directs Gregorv's
- " attorney to
$50 camcorder; $75 apron,
haininer & tools

1
I

Half of food: Beans
& Peas
Sheets & Coinforters
to inatch Pillowcase
from Shane's rooin
5 horses (Tony, Fire
Heart, Winchester
and 2 unnamed)
Mirror in family
room
Half of church
related books
acquired during the
marriage
Half of cllurch
related books
acquired during the
marriage
1998 Toyota Sienna
Van
I
1998 Toyota
Corrolla
I
/ ~ a loff buckets of 1

1

30

appears the parties have already
divided these items.
Stipulation

4000

Stipulation

75

Stipulation

30

Stipulation

30

5 125

Stipulation
I

Stipulation

4300
I

1

I

Stipulation
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honey
Half of buckets of
honey
Half of income tax
refund

I
I

1
I
I

I
I

I

Half of income tax
refund
Property identified in
paragraph 3 of the
parties' Stipulatioi~
(Defendant's Exhibit

Stipulation

1

Based on the parties' stipulation,
the parties svill evenly divide their
2006 income tax refunds ($5,241
federal and $746 state). See
Defendant's Exhibit N.

2993

2993

See above.
See Defendant's Exhibit N.

2585

See Defendant's Exhibit N.

9503

Property identified in
paragraph 4 of the
parties' Stipulation
(Defendant's Exhibit

M?
Debt owing to Bank
of Commerce (Ready
Reserve)
Debt owing to Juab
County Ambulance
Debt owing to
Inter~nountain
Healthcare
Sub-total
Equalization
payment from Ann
to Gregory

(149)

See Plaintiffs Exhibit 26.

(187)

See Plaintiffs Exhibit 26.

(1847)

See Plaintiffs Exhibit 26.

$94292
(3988)

$863 15
$3988

I

i

Total

$90304

/

I
$90303

w
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During the September 10,2007
i~lornlalconference in chambers,
counsel agreed Ann's equalization
payment would not be due until any
appeal from the trial court's decision
was final.

Y, DEBT & FEES

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW ON ATTORNEYS F E E S
7.

Ann parties asked for an award of attorneys fees under Idaho Code 5 32-

704. Idaho Code 5 32-704(3) states:
The court ]nay from time to time after considering thefinancial
resources of both parties and the factors set forth in section 32-705, Idaho
Code, order a party to pay a reasonable alnount for the cost to the other
party of maintaining or defending any proceeding under this act and for
attorney's fees, including sulns for legal services rendered and costs
incurred prior to the commencement of the proceeding or after entry of
judgment. The court ]nay order that the amount be paid directly to the
attorney, who may enforce the order in his name.
Idaho Code 5 32-705 states, in relevant part:
The . . . order shall be in such amounts . . . that the court deems just,
after considering all relevant factors which may include:
The financial resources of the spouse seeking [the
(a)
order], iilcluding the nlarital property apportioned to said
spouse, and said spouse's ability to lneet his or her needs
independently;
The time necessary to acquire sufficient education and
(b)
training to enable the spouse seeking [the order] to find
employment;
(c)

The duration of the marriage;

The age and the physical and emotional condition of
(d)
the spouse seeking [the order];
The ability of the spouse [against whoin the order] is
(e)
sought to meet his or her needs while meeting those of the
spouse [seeking the order];
(f)

The tax consequences to each spouse;

FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS ON PROPERTY,
DEBT & FEES
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(g)
8.

The fault of either party.

The court considers these factors as follows:
(a)

Thefinancial resources of the spouse seeking the order:

(I)

The property allocated to Ann includes alinost $33,000 cash

(including the proceeds froin the Wyoming 100 sale, the Katie Court sale
and the tax refund). She also has very substantial equity in the Etna
property and other real estate.
(2)

Ann estimates that her minilnuin annual living expenses will

be about $40,392. (See Defendant's Exhibit Q.) Ann could earn about
$20,000 per year at Melalucca. Her other annual resources include $9,300
child support Eroln Kevin Spencer, $10,848 child support from Gregory,
and $1,704 in net rentals.
(3)

Except for the $1,847 debt owing to Interinountain Health

Care, Ann's only significant debts are related to her real estate holdings.
(b)

The tinze necessar*yto acquire sufficient education and training:

The evidence did not address this factor.
(c)

The duration ofthe marriage:

The parties were inarried for almost ten years.
The age and the physical and emotional condition of the spouse
(d)
seeking [the order]:
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Ann suffered somewhat with depression, does not now suffer any
physical or emotional ailtnents that would affect her ability to pay fees.
The ability of the spouse [against whom ihe order] is sought to meet
(e)
his or her needs while meeting those of the spouse [seeking the order]:
The evidence did not establish Gregory's minilnuin annual expenses.
Gregory will earn $49,812 as a teacher during the 2007-2008 scl~oolyear.
He may also earn additional income as a carpenter-builder.
The tax consequences to each spouse:

Cfl

The evidence did not suggest any tax consequences related to a fee
award.

(g;)

The fault of either party:
The court: granted a divorce on grounds of irreconcilable differences.

9.

Considering all these facts, it is clear that each party has the ability to pay

his or her own attorneys fees. Accordingly, the court will exercise its discretion to order
that each party bear his or her own fees and costs.
Dated

9"\
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BONNEVILLE COUNTY
GREGORY PAUL BARRETT,
Plaintiff,
VS.

)

1
1
1
1
)

ANN MARIE B A m T T ,
Defendant.
-

1
1
1
1

Case No. CV-05-4852
JUDGMENT AND ORDER ON
ALL REMAINING ISSUES
(PROPERTY AND DEBT
DIVISION AND ATTORNEYS
FEES)

Based on the court's Findings of Fact and Conclusioi~sof Law entered August 30,
2007 and entered this day, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:

1.

The court coilfirlns that the following property is the sole and separate

property of the plaintiff (Gregory):

JUDGMENT AND OKDER ON ALL RE&MdpING ISSUES
.L u ,

Greg's recliner
Church related boolts Gregory owned before marriage
Stipulation (Defendant's Exhibit M)

I contribution to purchase of 681Katie Court
2.

The court confirins that the following properly is the sole and separate

property of the defendant (Ann):
Four horses (Stonny, Cherokee, Misty, Shadow, Tiger)
-

Trainpoline
Extra Iong log chain
Movies: Air Bud, Beethoven I & 11, Lion King I & I1
Church related books Ann owned before marriage
Property identified as Ann's separate property in the parties' written
Stipulation (Defendant's Exhibit M)
6113 interest in mobile home located in Thayne, WY
Bandsaw
3.

The court divides the parties' community propedy and the parties'

responsibility for paying the coininunity debts as follows:

I

/

Description
Real -property
. in Etna, Wyoming

$22,88 1 debt owing to Bank of Star Valley
Proceeds from Wyoming 100 sale in the trust
account of ~ o o l fCombo
,
& Thompson
Real property at 278 Contor (lot ($15000) and
double wide rnobiie home ($52000))
Debt owing to Wells Fargo secured by property at

To Ann
To Gregory
/One-half (as tenant lone-half (as tenant
/in common with /in coilnnon with 1
Gregory)
Ann)
Half
Half
$21334
$21334

JUDGMENT AND ORDER ON ALL REMAINING ISSUES
$ 0

c+

.e v I)

$67,000
(40 166)

I

I

278 N. Contor
Sale proceeds from real property at 68 1 Katie
Court
Debt owing to Gregory's separate estate for
reiinburseinent claim on 681 Katie Court sale
Real property located at 140 N. Adam (lot
($15000) and double wide inobile home ($52,000))
Debt owing to GMAC secured by real property at
140 N. Adain
Debt owing to Bonneville County for property tax
on 140 N. Adam
Mobile home located at 181 N. Adam
Debt owing to Bonneville County for property
taxes oil 181 N. Adan
Mobile home located in Thayne, Wyon~ii~g
Real property at 805 N. Stevens
Debt owing for expenses at 805 N. Stevens
Debt owing to Bonneville County for property
taxes on 805 N. Stevens
1998 Toyota Tacoina truck
Children's videos (Ann will pick out 6 more
videos, and Gregory will send them to her.)
Half food storage
Half food storage
Set of dining chairs
Silver inirror in inaster bedrooin
Mirror in the basement
Tools (including but not limited to shovels, rakes,
hoes, fence pliers, farin tools, etc.)
Baby jungle animal picture in Shannon's rooin
Cat and dog pictures in Brittana's rooin
1 plant stand froin Oakridge furniture
1 plant stand froin Oakridge furniture
Dogs on shelf picture in Kacey's rooin
,American shelfld6cor by the front door in the
coininunity home
4 stone vases with flowers

8593

8593

(3 148)

(3 148)

67000
(21843)
(175)
4000
(58)
4308

-1

(2000)
(78)
8425
1

1

p
p

1
1
600
40
75
200
15
20
25
. -

25

1
.
50
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ud

170

1

1

1 swivel roclter
1 swivel rocker

1

bedroom
Unhung picture of grapes and fruit with a gold
fiame
Picture in the downstairs bathrooin
Picture at the foot of the stairs
2 pictures in the den
1 Ficus tree
1 Ficus tree
,Flower arrangeinent above the inirror in the family
room
John Wayne movies (Ann will pick out 6 more
videos, and Gregory will send them to her.)
Cominunity interest in PERSI accounts (Base plan
and Choice plan)
Caincorder and Ann's nail apron with hamlner &
-tools
Half of food: Beans & Peas
Half of food: Beans & Peas
Sheets & Comforters to match Pillowcase from
Shane's room
5 horses (Tony, Fire Heart, Winchester and 2
unnamed)
Mirror in family room
Half of church related books acquired during the
marriage
Half of church related books acquired during the 1
marriage
1998 Toyota Sienna Van

,
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1 )
25
25
35
1
1
35

1

1

1

Half

Half

125
1
1
30
4000
75
30
30
5125

/

4.

Dated

Each party shall bear his or her own fees and costs.

y - 1 \ , . ~ .7
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on the ____ day of September 2007, I seived a true and correct copy
of the foregoing document on the persons listed below by mailing, wit1 the correct
postage thereon, by facsimile, or by causing the same to be hand delivered.

Deputy Court Clerlc

Aaron J. Woolf
P.O. Box 50160
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
FAX (208) 524-545 1

0Courthouse Box

Ci US Mail

C1 FAX

O Hand Delivery

Royce B. Lee
770 South Woodruff Avenue
Idaho Falls, ID 83401
FAX (208) 524-205 1

El Courthouse Box
Ci FAX
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I ., i

US Mail

D Hand Delivery

AARON J. WOOLF
ldaho State Bar #5791
THOMPSON SMITH WOOLF &ANDERSON, PLLC
501 Park Avenue
P.O. Box 50160
ldaho Falls, ID 83405
Telephone (208) 525-8792
Fax (208) 525-5266
Attorney for DefendantlAppellant, Ann Barrett.
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
GREGORY PAUL BARRETT,
PlaintiffIRespondent,
VS.

ANN MARIE BARRETT,
DefendantlAppellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-05-4852

NOTICE OF APPEAL

1
)

COMES NOW, DefendantlAppelIant, ANN MARIE BARRETT, by and through
her attorney of record, Aaron J. Woolf, Esq., of the law firm of THOMPSON SMITH
WOOLF & ANDERSON, PLLC, and hereby gives notice of her Appeal to the District
Judges Division of the District Court and hereby submits the following information:
I

This Appeal is taken from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District

of the State of ldaho in and for the County of Bonneville, Magistrate Division in Case
No. CV-05-4852, entitled Gregory Paul Barretf vs. Ann Marie Barreft.
2.

This Appeal is taken to the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of

the State of Idaho.
3.

The date and heading of the decisions from which the Appeal is taken

are: Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law on Property and Debt Division and
Attorneys Fees, entered September 11, 2007, and the Judgment and Order on All
Remaining Issues (Property and Debf Division and Aftorney Fees), entered September

11, 2007.
4.

This Appeal is taken upon matters of both fact and law.

5.

Appellant requests that a copy of the transcript be prepared for the trial

which was held on June 18,2007 through June 22,2007.
6.

The testimony and proceedings of the original trial held on June 18, 2007

through June 22, 2007, were recorded by tape recording which is in the custody of the
Clerk of the District, Magistrate Division, Bonneville County.
7.

The issues on Appeal are.
a.

Did the Court err by finding that the deed signed by Ann Barrett
transmuted her Etna, Wyoming real estate from separate property
to community property?

b.

Did the Court err by finding that the proceeds from the sale of the
Wyoming 100, LLC sale are community property?

8.

Plaintiff reserves the right to submit additional issues on appeal as

allowed by IRCP Rule 83(f)(6).
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DATED this

L??!

day of September, 2007.

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am a licensed attorney in Idaho, with my office in ldaho
Falls, and that on the

day of September, 2007, 1 served a true and correct copy of

the following-described document on the parties listed below, by mailing or by facsimile,
with the correct postage thereon, or by causing the same to be hand delivered
DOCUMENT SERVED:

NOTICE OF APPEAL
Mailed

Royce Lee, Esq.
Attorney at Law
770 S. Woodruff
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Hand Delivered

ax

AARON J. WOOLF
ldaho State Bar #5791
THOMPSON SMITH WOOLF & ANDERSON, PLLC
3480 Merlin Drive
P.O. Box 50160
ldaho Falls, ID 83405
Telephone (208) 525-8792
Fax (208) 525-5266
Attorneys for Defendant, Ann Marie Barrett
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
GREGORY PAUL BARRETT,
PlaintiffIRespondent,
VS.

ANN MARIE BARRETT,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-05-4852

DEFENDANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL

)

DefendantlAppellant.

)
1

COMES NOW, DefendantIAppellant, ANN MARIE BARRETT, by and through her
attorney of record, Aaron J. Woolf, Esq., of the law firm of THOMPSON SMITH WOOLF &
ANDERSON, PLLC, and hereby submits her Brief on Appeal, as follows:
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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves a divorce matter between the PlaintiffIRespondent,Gregory Paul
Barrett (hereinafter, "Greg"), and the DefendanffAppellant, Ann Marie Barrett (hereinafter,
"Ann"). A trial was held on June 18,2007 through June 22,2007. A Rule 54(b) Decree of
Divorce was entered on July 3, 2007, which divorced the parties, effective, June 22,2007.
The grounds for divorce were left to the Court for determination, as provided for in the
Decree of Divorce. Thereafter, on July 27, 2007, the parties filed a Stipulation Re:
Grounds for Divorce, in which the parties, through counsel, stipulated that the divorce
decree would be entered on irreconcilable difference grounds. On August 30, 2007, the
Honorable Earl Blower entered his Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Grounds
for Divorce, Child Custody and Child Support and his Order on Grounds for Divorce, Child
Custody and Child Support. The only relevant part of this decision and Order, for purposes
of the present appeal, is that it formally entered the divorce grounds, as irreconcilable
differences. On September 7 1, 2007, the Honorable Earl Blower entered his Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law on Property and Debt Division and Attorneys Fees, along with
his Judgment and Order on All Remaining Issues (property and debt division and attorneys
fees).

Ann filed her Notice of Appeal on September 14, 2007. The appeal brought by

Ann was in regard to the Magistrate's September 11, 2007 Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and Judgment and Order. There were numerous Orders entered by
the Magistrate after the Notice of Appeal was filed, but none of said Orders are relevant to
the pending appeal.
This appeal surrounds rulings made by the Magistrate regarding certain real
Plaintiff's Initial Brief on Appeal
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property, which was known at trial as the "Etna property".

11. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Ann and Greg were married on November I , 1997. Tr., V.l, p. 475, L. 8-10. They
were divorced, on irreconcilable difference grounds, effective June 22, 2007.
The issues presented on this appeal pertain to real property located in Etna,
Wyoming (hereinafter, "Etna property"). Tr., V.1, p. 377, L. 20-23. The property is located
just inside the Wyoming border. Tr., V.1, p. 378, L. 2-3. At trial, Ann testified that the Etna
property was her separate property. Tr., V.1, p. 378, L. 11-13. Ann acquired the Etna
property with her first husband, Kevin Spencer, when they purchased the land during their
marriage. Tr., V.1, p. 378, L. 17-21. Ann and Kevin Spencer, received a deed to the
property. Tr., V.1, p. 378, L. 22-24; and Plaintiff's exhibit 18 (Warranty Deed Ann and Kevin
Spencer received when they acquired the property) Tr., V.1, p. 213, L. 12. Ann and Kevin
Spencer were divorced on April 24, 1996. Tr., V.1, p. 378, L. 25; p. 379, L. 1-6. Plaintiff's
exhibit 19 is the Decree of Divorce which was entered between Ann and her former
husband, Kevin Spencer. Tr., V.1, p. 213, L. 12. In said Decree of Divorce, Ann was
awarded the Etna property. Tr., V.1, p. 379, L. 7-10. At the time of Ann's divorce to Kevin
Spencer, the Etna property consisted of approximately fifteen acres, a marital residence, a
mobile home, a hay shed, and a storage shed, located thereon. Tr., V.1, p. 383, L. 13-16;
Plaintiff's exhibit 19; Tr., V.1, p. 382, L. 15-22. After the Decree was entered, Kevin
Spencer signed two quitclaim deeds, whereby giving Ann the sole interest in the Etna
property. Tr., V.1, p. 379, L. 11-14; Plaintiff's exhibit 20; and Tr., V.1, p. 214, L. 13. The first
Quitclaim Deed was signed on March 31, 1997, and the second Quitclaim Deed was
signed on April 28, 1998. Plaintiff's exhibit 20. The reason for the two quitclaim deeds was
Plaintiff's Initial Brief on Appeal
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due to the fact that the first quitclaim deed contained an incorrect legal description. Tr., V.1,
p. 379, L. 15-20.
Ann and Greg became married on November 1, 1997. Tr., V.1, p. 475, L. 8-10. In
August of 1999, Ann sold part of the Etna property to Eric and Dawn Loveland. Tr., V.1, p.
383, L. 21-25; p. 384, L. 1-3. Specifically, Ann sold to the Loveland's two and one-half
acres, including her marital residence, for $88,500.00. Tr., V.1, p. 384, L. 10-20. Ann
transferred the acreage and the home through a Warranty Dee signed on August 12, 1999,
by she and Greg. Tr., V.1, p. 385, L. 5-22; Defendant's exhibit B (Warranty Deed); and Tr.,
V.1, p. 385, L. 22.
At the time of Ann's divorce to Kevin Spencer, there was a debt due and owing on
the Etna property, to Countrywide, in the approximate amount of $126,000.00. Plaintiff's
exhibit 19 and 21; Tr., V.1, P. 386, L. 2-15. When Ann sold the two and one-half acres to
the Loveland's, Countrywide was owed $122,355.54. Plaintiff's exhibit 22. Thus, when
Ann sold the acreage and home to the Loveland's for $88,500.00, there was still a
remaining balance owed to Countrywide in the approximate amount of $34,000.00, even
after the proceeds from the sale were applied to the Countrywide debt. Tr., V.1, p. 386, L.
8-20; Plaintiff's exhibit 22 (Settlement Statement for the sale of the property to the
Lovelands). Ann was required to pay off the Countrywide loan during the closing of the
sale of the acreage and home to the Loveland's. Tr., V.1, p. 386, L. 8-20; Plaintiff's exhibit
22. In order to do so, Ann acquired a loan through the Bank of Star Valley, in the amount
of $35,881.55, to pay off the remaining balance on the Countrywide loan. Tr., V.1, p. 386,
L. 16-20; Plaintiff's exhibit 24 (Promissory Note for the loan at the Bank of Star Valley).
Defendant's Brief on Appeal
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Countrywide was paid in full. Defendant's exhibit D (check to Countrywide).
The closing for the sale of the acreage and home to the Lovelands and the new loan
through the Bank of StarValley took place in one day, on August 12, 1999. Tr., V.1, p. 388,
L. 9-18. The closing took place at the Bank of Star Valley in Afton, Wyoming. Tr. V.1, p.

388, L. 19-20. During the closing, Ann, Greg, and a representative from the title company
were present. Tr., V.1, p. 388, L. 23-25. Ann and Greg signed dozens of documents. Tr.,
V.I., p. 389, L. 9-17. Ann did not read each of the documents, and she did not believe that
Greg did either, as the documents were presented to the parties too fast. Tr., V.1, p. 389,

L. 18-25. Greg admitted that he did not read all of the documents presented at closing.
Tr., V.1, p. 71 8, L. 17-19. The closing lasted for 20 to 30 minutes. Tr., V.1, p. 390, L. 2-3.
During the closing, Ann signed a Quitclaim Deed, which indicated that shewas transferring
the Etna property to she and Greg, as Tenants by the Entireties. Plaintiff's exhibit 23. Ann
did not recall anything specifically said to she and Greg at the closing, and she did not
recall signing the Quitclaim Deed, which was admitted as Plaintiff's exhibit 23. Tr., V.1, p.

390, L. 4-23. In fact, Ann did not specifically recall signing any of the documents that were
signed at closing. Tr., V.1, p. 390, L. 24-25; p. 391, L. I .
Ann admits that she signed the Quitclaim Deed which was admitted as exhibit 23,
but she said that she signed it because it was among several documents that she was
required to sign. Tr., V.1, p. 391, L. 2-6. Ann did not recall the closing agent giving her any
explanation of the meaning of the Quitclaim Deed. Tr., V.1, p. 391, L. 7-9. Ann testified
that if she had been told that the Quitclaim Deed was effectively giving Greg a one-half
~nterestin the Etna property, she would not have signed it. Tr., V.1, p. 391, L. 10-20. Ann,
Defendant's Brief on Appeal
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by signing the Quitclaim Deed, did not intend to give Greg a one-half interest in the Etna
property. Tr., V.1, p. 391, L. 21-24.
Prior to signing the documents at closing, Ann and Greg never discussed that Ann
was giving Greg an interest in the Etna property. Tr., V.1, p. 392, L. 4-1 1; Tr., V.1, p. 718, L.
20-25. After closing, Ann and Greg did not discuss the fact that Ann had potentially given
Greg a one-half interest in the Etna property. Tr., V.1, p. 392, L. 12-18; Tr., V.1, p. 718, L.
20-25. The first time Greg brought up the fact that he may have an interest in the Etna
property, was after this Divorce action was filed. Tr., V.1, p. 392, L. 19-25; p. 393; L. 1-6;
Tr.,V.I,p.719,L.21-25;p.720,L. I-5;Tr.,V.I,p.695,L.9-12.
During marriage, Greg did not take much of an interest in the Etna property. Tr., V.1,
p. 393, L. 10-11 and 23-25. From the date of marriage until the closing date in August,
1999, Ann paid the mortgage payment to Countrywide and the homeowner's insurance, all
from her separate checking account. Tr., V.1, p. 394, L. 8-25; p. 395; p. 396, L. 1-23. The
monies she used to pay these expenses were from her child support from her previous
marriage, the rental income she was receiving from her separate property, and from a
small allowance given to her by Greg. Tr., V.1, p. 394, L. 8-25; p. 395; p. 396, L. 1-23. Ann
continued to make the mortgage payment on the Etna property, from her separate bank
account, from the date of closing until the winter of 2003. Tr., V.1, p. 396, L. 24-25; p. 397,
L. 1-23. Thereafter, the parties had a joint account, but Ann continued to make the
mortgage payment to the Bank of Star Valley, with the exception of one or two instances
where Greg made the mortgage payment. Tr., V.1, p. 400, L. 7-11. During the entire
marriage, Ann always felt that this debt was her obligation, and Greg never offered any
Defendant's Brief on Appeal
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help in paying this debt. Tr., V.1, p. 399, L. 17-25; p. 400, L. 1-6.
In December, 2005, Ann sold approximately 2 acres of the Etna property to
Wyoming One Hundred, LLC. Tr. V.1, p. 401, L. 14-21. This acreage was part of the 15
acres Ann owned before marriage. Tr., V.1, p. 413, L. 1-6. In exchange for the sale of the
approximately 2 acres, Ann received $49,322.19 and she was supposed to have five lots
developed on her property, along with various other improvements. Tr. V.1, p. 403, L. 1-16;
Defendant's exhibit G; Tr. V.1, p. 404, L. 12-25; p. 405; p. 406; p. 407, L. 1-20; Plaintiff's
exhibit 27. None of the improvements that were supposed to be made, had been begun,
pursuant to the agreement with Wyoming One Hundred, LLC, and the time period within
which they were to have begun, had long expired. Tr., V.1, p. 405; p. 406; p. 407, L. 1-20.
The proceeds received from the sale of the approximate 2 acres were placed into Ann's
attorney's trust account. Tr., V.1, p. 401, L. 22-25; p. 402, L. 1-24; Defendant's exhibit F;
Plaintiff's exhibit 31. The parties agreed that the sale of the parcel of property to Wyoming
One Hundred, LLC, would have absolutely no effect on the classification of the proceeds
(separate property vs. community property) from the sale of said property, nor the
remaining parcel of the Etna property which was not being sold. Defendant's exhibit F.
Ann and Greg, through counsel, agreed that some of the funds held in Ann's attorney's
trust account could be used for various expenses incurred by the parties in this divorce
action. Tr., V.1, p. 412, L. 20-25; p. 413, L. 1-9. The remaining balance in said trust
account totaled $42,668.24, at the time of trial. Tr., V.1, p. 413, L. 10-23.
When Ann received the property in her Divorce to Kevin Spencer, the Etna property
was worth $160,000.00. Tr., V.1, p. 380, L. 7-18; Plaintiff's exhibit 19. At trial, Ann testified
Defendant's Brief on Appeal
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that the Etna property was now worth $350,000.00, and that the increase in value was due
to natural apprkciation. Tr., V.1, p. 381, L. 2-25; p. 382, L. 1-3. Even Greg's expert
witness, Tom Ogle, who was hired to appraise the real property, agreed that the Etna
property was worth $350,000.00, as of September 19,2006, the date of his appraisal. Tr.,
V.1, p. 333, L. 5-6. He also testified that the jump in value, from at least 2002, through the
date of the appraisal, was due to natural appreciation. Tr., V.1, p. 345, L. 7-24. The only
changes made to the Etna property during the parties' marriage were upkeep and repairs,
with no significant improvements. Tr., V.1, p. 382, L. 4-14. A gate was put onto the
property by Greg, however, the same was minimal, and it was constructed at a minimal
cost. Tr., V.1, p. 414, L. 22-25; p. 415; p. 416; p. 417; p. 418; p. 419, L. 1; Defendant's
exhibit H. Ann remarked that the Contract which was admitted as Plaintiffsexhibit 27, and
which required Wyoming One Hundred, LLC to improve the five lots on Ann's property, has
no added value to the Etna property, as the Contract is worthless. Tr., V.1, p. 616, L. 5-25;
p. 617, L. 1-16. Tom Ogle agreed with this, as he opined that it was too speculative to give
a value to the potential subdivision. Tr., V.1, p. 347, L. 10-25; p. 348.
At the time of trial, the Etna property consisted of approximately 10 acres, a mobile
home, a hay shed, a storage shed, and a little corral. Tr., V.1, p. 383, L. 13-16; Tr., V.1, p.
382, L. 15-22. All of the structures on the Etna property which were located on said
property at trial, were there when Ann received the property from Kevin Spencer, with the
exception of the little corral. Tr., V.1, p. 382, L. 20-22.
The balance of the loan owed to Countrywide as of the date of marriage was
$123,960.94. Tr., V.1, p. 214, L. 22-25; p. 215, L. 1-21; Plaintiff's exhibit 21. The balance
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of the loan owed to Countrywide as of the date the loan was paid off, during the closing in
August, 1999 was $121,819.55. Tr., V.1, p. 214, L. 22-25; p. 215, L. 1-21; Plaintiff'sexhibit
21. The original balance on the debt owed to the Bank of Star Valley was $35,881.55.
Plaintiff's exhibit 24. The debt owed to the Bank of Star Valley on or about the date of
divorce was $23,086.19. Tr. V.1, p. 400, L. 14-25; p. 401, L. 1-13; Defendant's exhibit E.
In the Court's September 11, 2007 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on
Property and Debt Division and Attorneys Fees, the Magistratefound thatthe signing of the
Quitclaim Deed (Plaintiff's exhibit 23) transmuted the Etna property, which was Ann's
separate property, into community property. The Magistrate further found that the
proceeds held in Ann's attorney's trust account were community property, for the same
reasons the Etna property was found to be community property. From this decision, Ann
filed her Notice of Appeal on September 14, 2007.
Ill. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Ann's issue on appeal is as follows:
1

Did the Magistrate err in finding that the Quitclaim Deed executed by Ann,
during a refinance, transmuted the Etna property from Ann's separate
property to community property?
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The characterization of property, will not be upheld if the record demonstrates an
abuse of discretion by the trial court. Matter of Eliasen's Estate, 105 Idaho 234, 238
(1983). The division of community property is subject to the sound discretion of the trial
court, but the trial court's determination will not be upheld if there has been a clear showing
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of an abuse of discretion. Hoskinson v. Hoskinson, 139 ldaho 448, 458 (2003).
The District Court exercises free review over questions of law. Stevens v.
Stevens, 135 ldaho 224, 227 (2000).
V. ARGUMENT
1.

The Magistrate erred by finding that the Quitclaim Deed sinned bv Ann during
a refinance transmuted her separate property into community property.
The Magistrate found that by Ann's execution of the Quitclaim Deed (Plaintiff's

exhibit 23), she transmuted her separate property interest into community property. The
Magistrate thus found that the Etna property and the proceeds in Ann's attorney's trust
account from the sale of a part of the Etna property to Wyoming One Hundred, LLC, were
community property. In ruling in this manner, the Magistrate erred.
The law regarding transmutation in ldaho is well documented. ldaho Code §32-917
allows spouses to transmute separate property into community property by following
certain formalities, which include the following: the contract must be in writing, and
executed and acknowledged or proved in like manner as conveyances of land are required
to be executed and acknowledged or proved. ldaho Code 332-917 (2007). However,
when one spouse claims the other spouse intended to transmute property orto make a gift,
the burden is on the party making the claim to prove the intent in question by clear and
convincing evidence. Ustick v. Ustick, 104 ldaho 215, 222 (1983). This is a high burden.
Hoskinson v. Hoskinson, 139 ldaho 448, 459 (2003).
A.

Hoskinson v. Hoskinson controls.

The ldaho Supreme Court has addressed the very issue pending in this case, in
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Hoskinson v. Hoskinson, 139 ldaho 448 (2003). In Hoskinson, the ldaho Supreme Court
upheld the Magistrate's determination that despite a Deed executed by husband, whereby
he conveyed his separate property interest in real property to himself and his wife, during a
refinance, the property remained husband's separate property. The facts in Hoskinson are
strikingly similar to those in the present case, as can be seen by the Supreme Court's
rendition of the Magistrate's findings:
In 1998 Reed's home was the subject of two separate
quitclaim deeds. In one deed Elizabeth conveyed her interest
in the property to Reed. In the other deed Reed conveyed his
interest in the same property to himself and Elizabeth, as
"husband and wife." Both deeds were signed and notarized on
January 23, 1998. The conveyance from Elizabeth to Reed
was recorded the same day. The conveyance from Reed to
himself and Elizabeth was recorded on February 9, 1998.
Elizabeth claims that the second conveyance transmuted
Reed's property from separate to community property.

Here, the parties offered conflicting evidence of the intent
behind the quitclaim deeds. Elizabeth testified that Reed
asked her to sign a quitclaim deed to facilitate the financing
and that she refused to sign until Reed agreed to sign a deed
conveying the property to her and Reed. Reed denied that
allegation. He testified he signed the quitclaim deed simply
because the lender presented it to him during the loan closing,
that he signed it along with many other papers the lender
presented to him, and that he had no intent to transmute his
property into community property. Reed notes that he alone
signed the promissory note for the new loan. Under these
circumstances, the court finds that Elizabeth has not proved a
transmutation by clear and convincing evidence. The evidence
did not establish that Reed intended to make a gift to the
community. The evidence did not establish whether the deed
to Reed and Elizabeth was signed before or after the deed to
Reed. As noted above. Elizabeth damaged her credibility with
her lack of candor during her testimony on other issues;
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therefore, the court is inclined to believe Reed's testimony on
the issue.
Hoskinson at 459-60.
The important facts to note in Hoskinson, are that the husband signed a deed, to his
separate property, during a refinance, to himself and his wife; husband signed the deed,
along with other documents presented to him at closing; husband did not intend to
transmute his separate property into community property; and husband's deed was
recorded after the deed wife had signed whereby conveying her interest in the property to
husband. The important legal issue to note in Hoskinson is that parol evidence was
considered by the Magistrate to determine whether wife had proved a transmutation of
husband's separate property by clear and convincing evidence. The Magistrate's decision
was upheld by the Supreme Court, and nothing was said regarding the parol evidence rule.
The facts in Hoskinson, are nearly identical to those in the present case. Ann
needed to refinance the Countrywide debt, on her sole and separate property, when she
I

sold a portion of her Etna property to the Lovelands During the refinancing, she was
handed dozens of documents to sign One of the documents she did sign, was a Quitclaim
I

Deed which Greg argues, transferred her separate property interest to she and Greg. The
Quitclaim Deed was recorded. Ann had absolutely no intention of giving Greg any interest
in her separate property. Ann and Greg did not discuss the possibility that Ann was giving
I

Greg a one-half interest in the Etna property before or after Ann signed the Quitclaim
Deed in fact, the first time Greg brought up the issue that he had a one-half interest in the

I

Etna property, was after the divorce complaint was filed. Greg agreed with all of the

I
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aforementioned facts. Greg offered no testimony in support of his claim that Ann's
separate property was transmuted, other than the Quitclaim Deed. Thus, the facts
illustrating that there was no transmutation of Ann's separate property, in this case are
even stronger than those in Hoskinson.
The Magistrate, in the matter before this Court, erred in failing to consider the facts
listed above, as he was required to do so, pursuant to the Hoskinson decision. Again, in
Hoskinson, the Magistrate considered intent testimony regarding the deeds, in order to
determine whether the wife had proven a transmutation by clear and convincing evidence.
This was upheld by the Supreme Court. In the case before this Court, the Magistrate
found that there was no ambiguity in the deed, and that the deed, itself, transmuted the
Etna property from Ann's separate property to community property. Despite the legal
doctrine approved of in Hoskinson, the Magistrate failed to consider the facts surrounding
the execution of the deed and the parties' intent, and instead, only looked to the deed.
This was an error, in light of Hoskinson. Further, when the facts of this case are reviewed,
it is abundantly clear that Greg cannot prove, by clear and convincing evidence that a
transmutation took place. In fact, all of the evidence points in favor of no transmutation
having taken place.
This result is also equitable. At trial, Ann and Greg's expert testified that the Etna
property was now worth $350,000.00. Further, there was $42,668.24 in Ann's attorney's
trust account. If the Magistrate's decision is upheld, Ann loses approximately $200,000.00,
of her separate propertyl. The only reason for this loss, would be because she refinanced

1 It is acknowledged that there would still be a community property interest, even if Ann prevails, but it will
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a debt on her separate property and signed a document which was required to be signed
by the Title Company. This is simply not right. Especially in light of the Hoskinson
decision
In his Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Property and Debt Division and
Attorneys Fees, the Magistrate attempts to distinguish the present case from Hoskinson,
but his argument is not persuasive. The Magistrate states as follows:
In Hoskinson, two deeds were signed on the same day: the
husband signed one deed purporting to convey the property to
himself and the wife; the wife signed the second deed
conveying the property to the husband. The evidence did not
establish which deed was signed first.
Those facts were cited to in the Supreme Court case of Hoskinson. However, the
Magistrate then continues in his Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Property and
Debt Division and Attorneys Fees, as follows:
The deeds contradicted each other. Because the language of
the deeds was not "plain and unambiguous," the court could
not "determine the intention of the parties . . . from the deed
itself." Hall v. Hall, 116 ldaho 483, 484, 777 P. 2d. 255, 256
(1989). The ambiguity created by the dual deeds, justified the
court's considering parol evidence of the parties' intent. See
Hall v. Hall, supra. That parol evidence led the court to find
that the parties intended no transmutation.
None of this analysis was cited by the Supreme Court in Hoskinson. Thus, this analysis
cannot be relied upon in distinguishing Hoskinson from the present case. In Hoskinson,

be minimal compared to the $400,000.00 community property interest the Magistrate has allowed for. In
fact, in Ann's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, she argues that the community is
entitled to an interest in the amount of $8,283.05. This amount was arrived upon by taking into account
the reduction in principal on the loans, during marriage (see Gapsch v. Gapsch, 76 ldaho 44, 53 (1954)),
less the reimbursement to Ann from the community for the use of her separate property monies held in
her attorney's trust account.
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the Supreme Court upheld the Magistrate's consideration of the parties' intent in
determining whether the wife had proved a transmutation by clear and convincing
evidence, in the factual scenario whereby a Quitclaim Deed is signed on a spouse's
separate property, during a refinance. The par01 evidence rule was not even referred to in
Hoskinson. This is not a situation where a deed is given during a purchase or an attempt
to transfer property between spouses. Rather, this is an all too common occurrence,
whereby one spouse is required to sign a Quitclaim Deed granting their separate property
to husband and wife, during a refinance. The Supreme Court's ruling in Hoskinson is
equitable and resolves this problem, by requiring a Magistrate to review not only the deed,
but also, the facts surrounding the entering into of the deed, as well as the parties' intent.
Even assuming that the analysis presented by the Magistrate in his attempt to
distinguish Hoskinson can be considered, it is not correct. The fact that there were two
deeds, does not mean that they were ambiguous, and thus, parol evidence could be
considered. Both deeds in Hoskinson were executed and recorded. The deed from
husband to husband and wife was recorded after the deed from wife to husband. This
scenario, is actually much clearer than the factual scenario in the case at hand. By signing
two deeds, it is clear that the parties had discussions regarding how the property was to be
titled. Further, the deed granting the property to both parties was recorded after the deed
from wife to husband. There is no ambiguity in that factual scenario, and this further
illustrates that the Magistrate is incorrect in attempting to distinguish the current case from
Hoskinson.

~
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The factual pattern in Hoskinson is identical to that in the present case. Perhaps
more importantly, once the facts of the present case are considered, as required by the
legal holding in Hoskinson, it is clear that Greg cannot meet his burden of showing that Ann
has transmuted her separate property by clear and convincing evidence, and thus, the
Etna property and the proceeds held in Ann's attorney's trust account, must remain her
separate property. To hold as the Magistrate did, is error.
I.

The Case Law Cited BYThe Maaistrate In His Decision, Is
Distinquishable.

In part of the Magistrate's decision, he cites to Hall v. Hall, I I6 ldaho 483 (1989)
and Bliss v. Bliss, 127 ldaho 170 (1995), for the propositions that generally, a quitclaim
deed executed with the formalities required by ldaho Code 332-917 is sufficient to meet the
burden that the spouse intended to transmute their property into community property and
further, where the language of a deed is plain and unambiguous, the intention of the
parties must be determined from the deed itself, and parol evidence is not admissible to
show intent
In jiaJ,the husband and wife acquired a ranch from husband's grandparent's for

$60,000.00. jiaJ at 483. At trial, husband's grandmother testified that at the time of the
sale, the ranch was worth $100,000.00and that the value above the $60,000.00 purchase
price was a gift. jiaJ at 484. The deed specifically said "for value received", and thus, the
testimony provided by husband's grandmother directly contradicted the language of the
deed. jiaJ at 484. The Supreme Court held that "Where, as here, the consideration
clause clearly recites that the transfer was made "For Value Received," parol evidence is
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not admissible to contradict the deed by attempting to show the transfer was in part a "gift"
rather than "for value". Id, Hall dealt with a factual pattern regarding a purchase and sale
of real property. Hoskinson and the present case pertaining to a refinancing scenario.
These are completely two different factual scenarios. During a purchase, it is understood
that both spouses are acquiring an interest in property when their names are placed on a
deed. This is not the case during a refinance, where the sole purpose of the transaction is
usually to obtain a loan and not to alter the title to the property. Further, Hall dealt with a
husband arguing that despite what the deed said regarding consideration, he should be
able to present additional evidence regarding an alleged gift. This is not the factual
scenario in Hoskinson nor the facts before this Court.
In

m,husband granted forty-eight acres to wife, and the deed was recorded.

Bliss at 174. The deed stated, in pertinent part, "THE GRANTOR, GORDON F. BLISS, a
married man, . . . for and in consideration of ONE DOLLAR and OTHER GOOD and
VALUABLE CONSIDERATION, conveys and quit claims to ALTHEA BLISS, a married
woman, as her separate property, whose address is . . ., the following described real
estate. . . (italics added, capitalization original)."

Id. At trial, the husband testified that he

signed the deed because he was trying to shelter the property from the IRS.

Id. The

Supreme Court held that husband's statements were not admissible to contradict the
deed's clear language. Id_ Again, the facts in Bliss are entirely different from the facts in
Hoskinson and the present case. in

a,husband executed a deed to transfer property to

wife as her sole and separate property. He knew that he was transferring the property,
even if it was to avoid the IRS. In Hoskinson and the present case, as argued above, the
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deed was signed during a refinance. Again, there are two entirely separate purposes
related to the transactions in

and Hoskinson. In

Bliss, the

sole purpose of the

execution of the deed was to transfer title of the property to wife.

Conversely, in

Hoskinson, and the present case, the purpose of the underlying transaction was to obtain
f~nancing,and not to transfer title to the property. Ann had no knowledge that she was
potentially transferring her separate property into community property.

Nor did the

husband in Hoskinson. This scenario is completely different than in Bliss.
ii.

Griffin v. Griffin is instructive.

Griffin v. Griffin, 102 ldaho 858 (Idaho Ct. App., 1982), is another ldaho case which
dealt with the issue of transmutation during a refinance scenario. In
acquired property before marriage.

Griffin at 860.

m,husband

During marriage, husband and wife

refinanced the property which husband acquired before marriage.

u As part of the

refinancing, husband and wife both signed the loan application, which stated that title to the
property would vest in the names of both, as joint tenants.

Id. Further, both parties, as

part of the refinancing, executed a note and deed of trust.

Title to the property

husband acquired before marriage, remained in his name. Id_ Wife argued, at trial, in part,
that husband had transmuted his separate property into community property because of
the refinancing.

uat 861. The Magistrate did not discuss the transmutation issue, but he

found that husband's property remained separate property, which is to say, that no
transmutation took place.

u

The ldaho Court of Appeals affirmed the Magistrate's

decision, when it held that no transmutation of husband's separate property had occurred.
Id. at 862. Of important note, is the Court of Appeals reference to the loan application
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form, which stated that the title would vest in the names of husband and wife, and which
was signed by both parties.

Id- at 861.

The Court of Appeals minimized this fact by

reiterating a portion of the decision of the district court, which stated that "the existence of
the plaintiff's signature on the deed of trust in all likelihood can be explained away as a
precautionary measure required by a prudent creditor".

Id.

This case is not directly on point, as there was no Quitclaim Deed signed by
husband to husband and wife. However, it is instructive in the present case, as it is line
with Hoskinson. First of all, it is a transmutation case, which revolves around a refinancing
of husband's separate property during marriage. Second of all, despite the written
document which was signed by both parties, which purported to illustrate their agreement
that the property should be titled jointly, in both husband's and wife's name, no
transmutation was found, as the signing of the document by wife was "a precautionary
measure required by a prudent creditor". Third, the Court of Appeals, looked to all of the
evidence surrounding the entering into of the documents, in determining whether the
Magistrate had erred in finding that no transmutation had taken place.
In the case before this Court, the Quitclaim Deed was signed by Ann, due to the title
company's or the lender's request. Ann did not request that she sign a Quitclaim Deed,
and in fact, she did not even know that she signed the Quitclaim Deed. The reason it was
signed, was because of a "precautionary measure required by a prudent creditorltitle
company". There was no other reason, and Greg did not even offer any conflicting
evidence, regarding the same. Thus, the facts of Griffin are somewhat consistent with the
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facts of the present case. This is further reason as to why it should be found that the
Magistrate erred by finding that a transmutation occurred by clear and convincing evidence.
B.

The parol evidence rule should not prohibit intent testimony in this
matter.

Even if it is determined that Hoskinson is not controlling on the facts of this case,
the parol evidence rule should not apply to this case, and thus, the Magistrate should
consider the facts regarding why Ann signed the Quitclaim Deed in question, along with
the parties' intent, in determining whether Greg has established a transmutation of
Ann's separate property, by clear and convincing evidence.
I.

The execution of a Quitclaim Deed during a refinancinn is entirely
different than the siqninn of a formal marital settlement agreement
or transmutation aareement.

ldaho Code s32-917 defines the requirements for a valid marriage settlement
agreement between spouses. I.C. §32-917 (2007). The requirements of I.C. §32-917 are
also used to determine whether there has been a valid transmutation agreement.
Stockdale v. Stockdale, 102 ldaho 870, 873 (Idaho Ct. App., 1982). The ldaho Supreme
Court in Stevens v. Stevens, 135 ldaho 224,227-28 (2000), defines a marriage settlement
agreement as a prenuptial agreement or an agreement being made with an eye towards
separation and/or divorce. Likewise, a transmutation agreement, is an arrangement
between spouses which changes the character of their property from separate to
community and vice versa. Stockdale at 872. Both of these documents are formal
documents entered into by husband and wife. Typically, they are lengthy documents which
specifically defines the property rights being given to the other spouse orto both spouses.
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Based upon the formality and completeness of these documents, the clear and convincing
evidentiary standard is met, once they are entered into. Conversely, the signing of a
Quitclaim Deed, during a refinance, which purports to transfer one spouse's separate
property interest to both spouses, as community property, is quite different.2 The
Quitclaim Deed, is often not read during the closing, and it contains standard, boilerplate
language, as was the case between Ann and Greg. Thus, in the refinancing scenario,
there should be more of a requirement than merely complying with I.C. §32-917, in
determining whether a spouse has proven a transmutation by clear and convincing
evidence. That additional requirement, is to look to all of the facts surrounding the entering
into of the Quitclaim Deed during the refinance, and the intent of the parties regarding the
signing of the Quitclaim Deed during the refinance. To find otherwise, as the Magistrate
did in this case, merely serves to potentially punish a spouse, who is attempting to
refinance her separate property, when not only was there no intent to transmute their
separate property into community property, but rather, they may not even know that they
signed the Quitclaim Deed.
ii.

The parol evidence rule is inapplicable to the facts before this Court,
as the Quitclaim Deed executed by Ann is ambinuous.

The signing of a Quitclaim Deed during a refinance is quite different than the signing
of a deed to transfer property. When a Quitclaim Deed is signed, merely to transfer
2 It is acknowledged that a deed signed by one spouse to the other, not during a refinancing situation, is a

valid transmutation. See &.
Further, a deed signed by one spouse, regarding that spouse's separate
property, to both spouses, not during a refinance, would be a valid transmutation. However, this is much
different than a deed signed during a refinance. The purpose of the transaction when there is no
refinance, is to transfer the real property. The purpose during a refinancing may be to only obtain a loan,
or it may be to obtain a loan and to transfer the property. This is why the holding in Hoskinson is correct,
because it requires a Court to look at the intent of the parties, in the refinancing situation, to determine
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property, there can only be one purpose, and that is to transfer the property in question. A
Quitclaim Deed, signed during a refinance, usually, is signed merely because it is required
by the title company while a party is refinancing a debt on their separate property, as was
the case in Hoskinson and this case. Though, it may also be that a Quitclaim Deed is
signed, during a refinance, to not only obtain a loan, but also to transfer title to the
property. Thus, the Quitclaim Deed, signed during a refinance, is ambiguous. It is well
settled that parol evidence may be considered to aid the trial court in determining the intent
of the drafter of a document if an ambiguity exists. Simons v. Simons, 134 ldaho 824,828
(2000). Thus, the parol evidence rule should not apply in a situation, as we have here,
where one spouse owns separate property, and during the refinance, she signs a Quitclaim
Deed in favor of herself and her husband, as the competing purposes behind the deed in
this scenario shows that the deed itself, is ambiguous. Parol evidence, should then be
properly considered, so as to determine the intent of the parties, as to whether the
Quitclaim Deed was signed just to obtain a new loan, or conversely, to obtain a new loan
and to transfer property to both spouses, as community property.
...

111.

If the parol evidence rule is held to applv to the factual scenario of this
case, it does a great iniustice to the clear and convincing evidence
standard for gifts and transmutations.

As stated above, ldaho law is clear that where one spouse claims that the other
spouse intended to transmute property or to make a gift, the burden is on the party making
the claim to prove the intent in question by clear and convincing evidence. Ustick v. Ustick,
104 ldaho 215, 222 (1983).

whether the party arguing for a transmutation has met their burden by clear and convincing evidence.
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If the parol evidence rule can be used to prohibit intent testimony in the situation
before this Court, as ruled by the Magistrate, then the clear and convincing standard is
essentially eradicated, as the Court would only need to see if a deed was signed,
regardless of the facts surrounding the execution of the same. It is admitted that this
exception to the parol evidence rule should be limited to the refinancing situation, as
illustrated in this case. The reason for this exception is because there is generally no
intention to transmute a spouse's separate property to community property, during the
refinance. However, there may be a scenario, whereby the spouse refinancing does intend
to transmute hislher separate property to community property during a refinance. This
refinance example differs greatly from the factual situation in Bliss. In

m,the Husband

fully intended to execute the deed and to transfer the real property out of his name. That
was the entire purpose of the transaction. Conversely, during a refinance, the new loan is
the main transaction, and the signing of documents, including any deeds presented, if even
known, is secondary. This is the reason the Court should be allowed to look at all of the
surrounding circumstances when a deed is signed, whereby purporting to transfer one
spouse's separate property, into community property, during a refinance. This allows the
clear and convincing evidence standard, which is required to prove a transmutation, to not
be swallowed by the parol evidence rule, in the refinancing situation.

C.

Ann Quitclaimed her separate property to Greg to refinance a loan on
her separate property, and not to presently convey title to her separate
property.

In Barmore v. Perrone, 179 P.3d 303 (2008), the Idaho Supreme Court recently
addressed a factual scenario similar to the facts at hand in the present case. In said case,
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husband signed a quitclaim deed purportedly conveying real property located in ldaho, to
his wife.

at 305. After this deed was signed, wife sought to annul their marriage.

Id.

Wife moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of whether the real property which
was quitclaimed to her, was hers.

Husband argued that the sole purpose of the

quitclaim deed was to avoid probate, and not unconditionally presently to convey the
Id. The Magistrate ruled in favor of Wife.
property to Barmore. --

The District Court

reversed the Magistrate Court's decision, and thereafter, the matter was appealed to the
Supreme Court.

u

One of the main issues addressed by the Supreme Court was

whether the parol evidence rule bars admission of evidence of husband's intent.
In determining that it does not, the ldaho Supreme Court sated as follows:
A deed "does not take effect as a deed until delivery
with intent that it shall operate. The intent with which it is
delivered is important. This restricts or enlarges the effect of
the instrument." Bowers v. Cottrell, 15 ldaho 221. 228, 96 P.
936, 938 (1908) (internal quotations omitted). In addition,
"[ejven where the grantee is in possession of the deed, though
that may raise a presumption of delivery, still it may be shown
by parol evidence that a deed in possession of the grantee
was not delivered." Id. (internal quotations omitted). The
"controlling element i n x e question of delivery" is the intention
of the grantor and grantee. Id. "The question of delivery is
one of intention, and the rule is that a delivery is complete
when there is an intention manifested on the part of the grantor
to make the instrument his deed."
(internal quotations
omitted). "[Tjhe real test of the delivery of a deed is this: Did
the grantor by his acts or words, or both, intend to divest
himself of title? If so, the deed is delivered.
140 ldaho 16.21, 89 P.3d 856, 861 (2004) (internal quotation
omitted).

u

"It is beyond controversy that the evidence of delivery
must come from without the deed. In other words, a deed
never shows upon its face nor by the terms thereof a delivery,
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at 307.

and oarol evidence thereof must necessarilv be admitted when
the question of delivery arises." Whitnev v. Dewey, 10 ldaho
63, 655, 80 P. 1117, 1121 (1905).
Since delivery of a deed is necessary for the deed's
validity, any evidence is admissible if it indicates the absence
of delivery. Therefore, the parol evidence rule does not bar
admission of evidence used for the purpose of determining
whether delivery of the relevant deed occurred.
Id. at 307-08.
Wife argued that the factual scenario in Barmore v. Perrone, was identical to that in
the case of &,

whereby the ldaho Supreme Court refused to consider evidence

regarding husband's intent, because doing so would have contradicted the deed's plain
language. The ldaho Supreme Court in Barmore v. Perrone, distinguishedBliss, by stating
that "This ruling (in

m)was correct because husband was not challenging the validity of

the deed itself or that he intended to convey the property, i.e., deliver the deed, but instead
challenged only the purpose for delivering the deed, attempting to contradict the plain
language of the deed." (parentheses added).

Id.at 308. Thereafter, the ldaho Supreme

Court held that since husband was challenging the delivery of the deed, extrinsic evidence
should be permitted, and thus, the parol evidence rule would not bar the admission of
evidence regarding husband's intent in executing the deed.

Id.

In the case at hand, Ann did not intend to convey the Etna property to Greg.
She testified to the same, when she testified that she did not intend to give Greg a one-half
interest in the Etna property, and further, if she knew that by signing the deed, she was
giving him a one-half interest in the property, she would have never signed the deed. Ann
did not intend to convey (i.e., deliver the deed to) her Etna property. Rather, she was
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merely attempting to refinance a debt on her separate property. Based upon the same,
evidence of Ann's intent in executing the Quitclaim Deed at issue is not barred by the par01
evidence rule, and it should have been considered by the Magistrate in determining
whether Greg met his burden of proving a transmutation by clear and convincing evidence.
And once Ann's intent evidence is considered, along with all of the other evidence
regarding the entering into of the Quitclaim Deed, as argued, above, it becomes
abundantly clear that Greg cannot meet his burden of proving a transmutation by clear and
convincing evidence, as he only relies upon the Quitclaim Deed, itself.
VI. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, Ann requests that this Court reverse the Magistrate's ruling that
the Etna property and the funds held in Ann's attorney's trust account were transmuted
into community property. Ann would further request, that this Court find, as a matter of
law, that there was no transmutation, and thus the Etna property and the funds held in
Ann's attorney's trust account are her separate property. Ann would also request that
the issue of the community property interest in Ann's separate property be remanded to
the Magistrate for determination, based upon the evidence already presented.
Respectfully submitted this
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1. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Greg Barrett concurs in the statement of the case in Ann Barrett's Brief on
Appeal.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Greg Barrett submits the following statement of facts to supplement the statement
of facts in Ann Barrett's Brief on Appeal.

Both Greg and Ann Barrett jointly participated in negotiating the terms of the
loan with the Bank of Star Valley which was used to refinance the loan on the Etna,
Wyoming, property when they sold two and a half acres to Mr. and Mrs. Loveland on
August 12,1999.Ann and Greg met together at the Bank of Star Valley with a distant
cousin of Ann named Rod to apply for and establish the terms of the loan. TR., V.1, P.

226,L. 16to P. 228,L. 7.Ann was not working at the time of the Etna loan application
and had no income other than her child support, rental income from a single wide trailer
on the Etna property and sharing in the community property income of Greg Barrett
from his employment. TR., V.1, P. 220,L. 1 to 2;and TR., V.1, P. 394,L.18to P. 395,
L. 18.The Bank of Star Valley loan was given to both Ann and Greg. Tr. V.1, P. 221,L.

20 to P. 223,L.15;
Plaintiff's Exhibit 24.
Ann and Greg met together with the title company closing agent to close the
Bank of Star Valley loan on the Etna property. During the closing the title agent went
over each document separately and explained each document to Ann and Greg. TR.,

V.I,P.~~~,L.~~OP.~~O,L.~~;TR.,V.I,P.~~O,L.~~O~~
PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF ON APPEAL -6

j-;

&

:
,
f
,

~

d

22 to P. 629, L.3. Greg asked questions on the closing documents if he did not
understand them and the title agent answered all questions asked. TR., V.1, P. 229, L.

22 to P. 230, L. 4. Although Ann claims no memory now about signing specific
documents at closing, by her presence she participated in the discussion with Greg and
the title closing agent and had each document explained to her by the title closing agent
at the time of closing. She had the opportunity to ask any questions about the
documents and what they meant if she did not understand them. She heard the
questions by Greg and the answers given by the closing agent at the time of closing.
TR., V.1, P. 229, L. 8 to P. 230, L. 15. Ann did not raise any questions or objections at
the time of closing about any of the documents, including the Quitclaim Deed from Ann
to Greg and Ann. TR., V.1, P. 230, L. 5 to 8. Ann admitted that she did sign the Etna
Quitclaim Deed at the closing. Exhibit 23. TR., V.1, P. 390, L. 14 to 17 and TR., V.1, P.

226, L. 6 to 7.
Ann knew what she was signing when she signed the Quitclaim Deed. Ann
admitted that she knew the purpose and effect of a Deed was to transfer title and
ownership to real property. TR., V.11, P. 629, L. 25 to P. 630, L. 24; TR., V.11, P. 635, L.

19 to P. 636, L. 9.
Ann had previous experience in real estate in which she bought, sold and
transferred property through a Deed. Ann acquired ownership of the Etna property in

1989 through a Warranty Deed from the seller to Kevin and Ann Spencer. Plaintiff's
Exhibit 18.TR., V.11, P. 632, L. 13 to 633, L. 4; and TR., V.1, P. 378, L. 17 to 24. Ann
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received a transfer of ownership for the Etna property through the Decree of Divorce
dated April 24, 1996. TR., V.1, P.379, L. 3 to 9; Plaintiff's Exhibit 19.Ann also received
a transfer of Kevin Spencer's ownership to her pursuant to two Quitclaim Deeds dated

March 31, 1997, and April 28, 1998, the original having an error in the legal
description. Plaintiff's Exhibit 20 and TR., V.1, P. 214, L. 1 to 13. Ann knew and
understood the effect of those two Deeds prior to her signing the Quitclaim Deed to her
and Greg on the Etna property in August, 1999. TR., V.1, P.379, L. 11to P.380,L. 1
and TR., V.11, P. 633, L. 5 to 25. Ann and Greg jointly signed on August 12, 1999, a
Warranty Deed to the Lovelands on the two and a half acres of the Etna property at the
same time Ann signed the Quitclaim Deed to Greg at the closing of the new loan from
the Bank of Star Valley on the Etna property. Plaintiff's Exhibit 22 and Defendant's
ExhibitB;TR.,V.II, P.630,L.5to24;TR.,V.I,P.384,L.2
to 19;andTR.,V.I,P.216,
L. 6 to 17. Ann admitted that the Quitclaim Deeds from Kevin Spencer to her at Exhibit
20 were the same as, and accomplished the same thing as, the Quitclaim Deed from
Ann, to Ann and Greg on the Etna property. Exhibit 23 and TR., V.11, P. 635, L. 10 to

P.636, L. 9.
Ann Barrett raised no objection during the closing of the Etna loan to any
documents, including the Quitclaim Deed. TR., V.1, P. 230, L. 7 to 8;P.232, L.15 to
17. She made no objection to the Quitclaim Deed after the closing until after the divorce
was filed. TR., V.11, P. 637, L. 7 to 22.
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Greg testified that he understood at the time of closing the meaning of the
Quitclaim Deed from Ann to Greg and Ann which was signed by her at closing and he
understood and assumed it was a valid transfer of a one-half interest to him. TR., V.1, P.
230, L. 16 to P. 231, L. 24; and TR., V.11, P. 719, L. 3 to P. 720, L. 9. Greg further
understood that he was a co-signer on the Etna loan and as a result had legal
responsibility to pay that loan. TR., V.1, P. 230, L. 16 to P. 231, L. 24.
At the time of Greg and Ann's marriage they established a budget and assigned
various bills to each person for payment. Originally they maintained separate bank
accounts. Each account was commingled with community property funds. Ann's
account received deposits from her child support, the rental income from the rent for her
singlewide mobile home on the Etna property, TR., V.1, P. 394, L. 18 to 24 (net rental
income from separate property is community property) and an amount from Greg's
community income which was budgeted for Ann to pay bills, TR., V.1, P. 395, L. 4 to
13. Ann did not maintain a separate property account for payment of the Etna loan
after marriage and before or after the refinancing in 1999with the Bank of Star Valley.
The fair market value of the Etna property at the date of Ann's divorce in April,

1996, was established by the Decree of Divorce to be $160,000.00. The Decree also
recited that the mortgage at that time was $124,000.00 so there was equity of
$34,000.00. Plaintiff's Exhibit 19. The Etna property value appreciated by the time of
the divorce of Ann and Greg in 2007. However, according to Tom Ogle, who appraised
the Etna property, most of that appreciation occurred after 2002 when there was a
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boom in property values arising from the pressure from high land prices in nearby
Jackson, Wyoming. TR., V.1, P. 344, L. 15 to P. 345, L. 6. The value of the Etna
property at the time of the refinancing in August, 1999, was probably not significantly
more than at the date of divorce in April, 1996, based on the testimony of Tom Ogle
that the big increase occurred after 2002. Therefore, the one-half of the equity
transferred to Greg Barrett by the Quitclaim Deed in August, 1999,would have been in
the range of $17,000.00, (one-half of the $34,000.00 at the prior divorce in 1996),or
slightly higher but not significantly higher. As consideration for Greg receiving one-half
of the equity in the Etna property, Greg assumed responsibility for the new loan of
$35,881.55 and made his separate and community property now liable as a resource
for payment on such loan. TR., V.1, P. 230, L. 16 to P. 231, L. 24.
Greg participated in ownership and management of the Etna property after title
was transferred to him by Ann's Quitclaim Deed. That involvement included general
upkeep and repairing and maintaining the property fences, TR., V.1, P. 382, L. 4 to 8,
applying and obtaining a permit to increase the access from a narrow farming access on
Highway 89 to a wider residential access, TR., V.1, P. 415, L. 1 0 to P. 416, L. 11;TR.,
V.I,P.338,L. 1 3 t o P . 3 3 9 , L . ll;TR.,V.l,P.346,L. 1 0 t o 15;TR.,V.I,P.367,L.24
to 372, L. 12; and Plaintiff's Exhibits 33 and 34. This new access gate was considered as
adding value to the property by Tom Ogle. TR., V.1, P. 338, L. 6 to 11.
Greg was primarily responsible for negotiating a better sale price for two acres of
the Etna property sold to the Wyoming 100, LLC, in 2005 for access to an adjoining
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development project. Ann was willing to accept the first offer of $10,000.00 (TR. V.1 P.
242, L. 3 to 6) but Greg recommended making a higher counteroffer. Such negotiations
resulted in the first offer to purchase going from $10,000.00 to a final agreement of
$50,000.00 plus the development of five lots for Greg and Ann Barrett with a potential
net profit of $250,000.00. TR., V.1, P. 234, L. 2 1 to P. 250, L. 12; and Plaintiff's Exhibit
28 and 29. The sale resulted in net sale proceeds of $49,322.19 paid to Greg and Ann,
and placed in Aaron Woolf's trust account during the proceedings by stipulation of the
parties.
161. ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Ann's issue on appeal is as follows:
1.

Did the Magistrate err in finding that the Quitclaim Deed executed
by Ann, during a refinance, transmuted the Etna property from
Ann's separate property to community property?

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The District Court as appellate court should uphold the trial judge's findings of
fact if supported by substantial and competent evidence. Bliss u. Bliss, 127 Idaho 170,
848 P.2d 1081. The characterization of property is subject to the sound discretion of the
I

I

trial court, and should be upheld in the absence of a clear showing of an abuse of
discretion. Matfer of Eliasen's Estate, 105 Idaho 234, 668 P.2d 110 (1983).
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V. ARGUMENT
1.
-

The Magistrate ruled correctly that Ann transmuted her separate
property into community property bv transferring a Quitclaim Deed
to herself and Greg Barrett.
In Defendant's Brief on Appeal Ann argues that there should be a different rule

when a Husband or Wife refinance separate property and transfer title to both Husband
and Wife. Alternatively, Ann argues that application of the parol evidence rule violates
the clear and convincing evidence rule for a transmutation.

A.

Noskinson v . Noskinson supports Greg Barrett's claim of a

transmutation from separate property to community property.
Ann submits the case of Hoskinson v. Hoskinson. 139 Idaho 448.80 P.3d 1049

@'003), as controlling in the present case. However, the Hoskinson case is
distinguishable based on the facts of that case and actually supports Greg Barrett's
position and the trial judge's decision in the present case
In the Hoskinson case the husband obtained financing which utilized his separate
property as security. At the time of the financing the wife signed a quitclaim deed to the
husband, and the husband signed a quitclaim deed to himself and his wife as husband
and wife. Both deeds were dated January 23, 1998. The wife's deed to husband was
recorded on the same day and husband's deed to husband and wife was recorded on
February 9, 1998.There was a conflict in the testimony about the purpose and effect of
these two conflicting deeds. The wife claimed she had refused to sign a quitclaim deed

- --

0,
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to allow the financing to occur unless the husband conveyed a quitclaim deed back to
her and him. The husband claimed that he had signed a quitclaim deed adding the wife
only because the lender gave it to them to sign at closing and that the wife had signed
her quitclaim deed back to him to release her claim to his separate property after the
financing. He claimed he had no intention to transmute ownership of his separate
property to community property. It is important to note that only the husband signed
the promissory note on the new loan and the wife did not become personally obligated
on the new loan. The trial judge noted that it was unclear which deed had been signed
first and that the wife had not been truthful in her testimony on other matters. Based
thereon the trial judge concluded that the wife had not met her burden of proof to show
a transmutation of the separate property interest of the husband in his real estate to a
community property interest for husband and wife. The Idaho Supreme Court did not
rule that a deed from one spouse to the other during refinancing is not a transmutation,
nor did it suggest a different rule in refinancing cases. The Supreme Court merely held
there was sufficient evidence to support the trial judge's findings.
In the Hoskinson case there are important factual differences to consider when
comparing it to the present case. First, Greg Barrett signed the promissory note and
deed of trust at the time of the refinancing and became personally obligated on the new
loan. This obligated his community property and his separate property as a source for
repayment. In the Hoskinson case a transfer from the husband to the wife would have
been a gift because the wife did not assume any personal liability and therefore no
0,
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consideration was given for the change to a community property interest. Greg assumed
a significant obligation on the new loan which is adequate and legal consideration for
receiving a community property interest in the property. Second, in the present case
there was no quitclaim deed back to Ann Barrett from Greg to create an ambiguity. In
the Hoskinson case the two conflicting deeds created an ambiguity which allowed parol
evidence to be considered on the intention of the parties. Third, it is important to note
that the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the trial judge as the finder of fact based
on substantial competent evidence which was not clearly erroneous. Hoskinson at 1061.
The Supreme Court did not rule whether as a matter of law the transfer from husband
to wife in Hoskinson was or was not a valid transfer. The Supreme Court merely upheld
the trial judge's conclusions a s being sufficiently supported by substantial competent
evidence. Fourth, in the present case there was not a question about Greg testifying
honestly and correctly as existed in the Hoskinson case. In Hoskinson the trial judge
adopted husband's testimony because wife had not been truthful in other matters. In
fact, there was really no conflict between the testimony by both Greg and Ann about the
circumstances relating to the signing of the new loan documents and the quitclaim deed.
After determining there was an ambiguity in the transfer documents the trial judge
in Hoskinson considered parol evidence regarding the intent of the parties. Ann argues
that the trial judge should have considered parol evidence in the present case even
though there was no ambiguity in her transfer documents. However, in contrast with the
Hoskinson facts, in the present case there was no ambiguity from conflicting deeds,
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there was no alternate deed reversing the other deed and there was no written
agreement to counter or undo the transfer of the Etna property into Greg's and Ann's
names.
interestingly, Judge Blower was the trial judge in both the Hoskinson case and the
Barrett case, and presumably knew well the facts and his ruling in Hoskinson, as he
rendered his decision on the facts in the present case.
i. THE CASE LAW CITED BY THE MAGISTRATE IN HIS DECISION

SUPPORTS GREG BARRETT'S POSITION.
Ann argues in Defendant's Brief on Appeal that the case law cited by the trial
judge in the present case is distinguishable. In the first case cited by the trial judge, !+aJ
o.

Hail,116 Idaho 483. 777 P.2d 555, grandparents had sold property to a grandson

and his wife. The deed was recorded and the required payment of $60,000.00 was
made. Later when the grandson and wife were divorcing the grandmother claimed that
the property was worth $100,000.00 at the time of the transfer and $40,000.00 was
intended as a gift to the grandson only. The transfer deed said that the property was
transferred "for value received." Based on these facts the Idaho Supreme Court upheld
the application of the par01 evidence rule and found that the deed was plain and
unambiguous so the court must determine the intent from the deed itself. The Court
stated that the parties were not allowed to contradict a clear deed with oral or written
statements, and only if the document is ambiguous will evidence of facts and
surrounding circumstances be admissible. In !+aJthe Supreme Court held that the deed
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was clear and unambiguous in its statement that the transfer was "for value received" so
consideration was given and par01 evidence would not be admissible to support a claim
that part of the transfer was a gift to the grandson.
The Supreme Court's decision in the H A case supports the trial judge's decision
in the present case. As in

m,Ann conveyed title by

a clear and unambiguous

Quitclaim Deed to herself and Greg as tenants by the entirety1. Because there was no
ambiguity in the deed, the deed controls, and additional evidence about the parties'
intent from the facts and circumstances cannot be considered.
The second case relied upon by the trial judge in the present case was Bliss v.
Bliss. 127 Idaho 170,898 P.2d 1081. In that case the husband had signed a deed to his
wife on forty-eight acres of real property and the deed was recorded. At the divorce trial
husband argued that he had signed the deed in order to avoid an IRS lien against him
on the forty-eight acres. The wife gave conflicting testimony as to the parties' intent
regarding the deed. The husband argued the deed was void for lack of consideration
and that he had not intended to actually convey his interest in the community property
to his wife as separate property. The Idaho Supreme Court noted that the deed was in
writing, signed by the grantor, and included the name and address of the grantee, so it
constituted a valid conveyance of legal title to real property according to Idaho Code

955-601. Id. at 174. The Court then noted the presumption from Idaho Code 932l ~ e n a n by
c ~the entirety is recognized in Wyoming where the Etna property is located and the closing occurred.
Wyoming statutes, 534-1-140. For purposes of this case both parties have treated the community property laws of
Idaho as consistent with a Tenancy by the entirely.
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906(2) that "property conveyed to one spouse by the other shall be presumed to be the
sole and separate estate of the grantee". Id. at 174.
The Supreme Court ruled that the husband's statements to show his intent or that
there was no consideration were inadmissible under the parol evidence rule since the
deed was plain and unambiguous.
However, Gordon's statements regarding intent and consideration were
inadmissible to contradict the deed's clear language. In Hull o. Hull we
reiterated that where a deed is plain and unambiguous, the intention of
the parties must be determined from the deed itself. "Oral and written
statements are generally inadmissible to contradict or vary unambiguous
terms contained in a deed." Id. Here, not only did Gordon "convey" the
property to Althea, thereby raising the presumption of separateness under
I.C. 532-906(2), the deed expressly states the land is conveyed "as her
separate property." Further, the deed unambiguously declares that it is "in
consideration of ONE DOLLAR and OTHER GOOD AND VALUABLE
CONSIDERATION." Gordon's extrinsic evidence is inadmissible to
contradict these clear statements. Thus, the evidence offered to rebut the
statutory presumption of I.C. 532-906(2)was legally insufficient. (Citations
omitted). Bliss v. Bliss, 127 Idaho 170, 174-5.
The Supreme Court further explained the policy considerations underlying the
parol evidence rule as well as the statute of frauds.
As we understand the statute [of frauds] above quoted, it was intended to
prevent just such a class of proof and to preclude the possibility of titles
becoming subject to the capricious memories of interested witnesses. The
statute was enacted to guard against the frailties of human memory and
the temptations to litigants and their friendly witnesses to testify to facts
and circumstances which never happened. Experience had convinced
both jurists and lawmakers that the only safe way to preserve and pass title
to real property is by a written conveyance subscribed by the grantor. The
beneficial effects of this statute would be destroyed if a grantor could come
in years afterwards and submit oral testimony to show that the conveyance
was not intended as an absolute grant but was only intended to create a
trusteeship in the grantee. Id. at 175.
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The applicable facts in

are identical to the facts in the present case. Ann

conveyed by Quitclaim Deed an interest in real property to herself and Greg. The Deed
is clear and unambiguous. The deed was in writing, signed by the grantor and included
the name and address of the grantee as required by I.C. $55-601. The same
presumption in I.C. $32-906(2)applies in the present case to show that Greg received a
separate one-half interest in the community property. Ann's "extrinsic evidence" is
inadmissible to contradict these "clear statements". Ann's "evidence offered to rebut the
statutory presumption of I.C. s32-906(2)was legally insufficient." The Idaho Supreme
Court's explanation of the policies and considerations underlying this rule are also
applicable in the present case. The beneficial effects of the statute of frauds which
requires transfers to be in writing would be destroyed if the grantor, in this case Ann,
"could come in years afterwards and submit oral testimony to show that a conveyance
was not intended." Certainty in real estate transactions has been historically determined
to require compliance with the formalities required by statute in the State of Idaho.
Therefore, Ann should not be permitted to violate the statute of frauds and introduce
extrinsic evidence years later in opposition to her signed deed to Greg Barrett.
The same principles in Hall v. Hall and Bliss v . Bliss, apply in this case. Ann's
deed to Ann and Greg is clear and unambiguous. On its face it conveys a one-half
undivided interest in the Etna property to Greg. Therefore, the presumption of Idaho
Code S32-906(2)applies in favor of Greg. Ann has the burden to go forward with other
evidence to overcome that presumption. She gave no admissible evidence to counter
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the presumption. Therefore, the deed should be enforced as a valid transfer to Greg
Barrett.
ii. THE TRANSFER OF A QUITCLAIM DEED FROM ANN TO GREG

COMPLIED WITH ALL STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS FOR
CONVEYANCES OF REAL PROPERTY AND TRANSFERS BETWEEN
SPOUSES.
The requirements for a valid conveyance of real property are noted in Idaho
Code $9-503 and 9-505, which are statutory declarations of the common law rule based
on the statute of frauds, as follows:

9-503. Transfers o f real property to be in writing. - No estate or
interest in real property, other than for leases for a term not exceeding one
(1)year, nor any trust or power over or concerning it, or in any manner
relating thereto, can be created, granted, assigned, surrendered, or
declared, otherwise than by operation of law, or a conveyance or other
instrument in writing, subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning,
surrendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto
authorized by writing.

9-505. Certain agreements to be in writing -In the following cases
the agreement is invalid, unless the same or some note or memorandum
thereof, be in writing and subscribed by the party charged, or by his agent.
Evidence, therefore, of the agreement cannot be received without the
writing or secondary evidence of its contents:. ..4. An agreement for.. . the
sale of real property, or of an interest therein.. ..
Ann Barrett satisfied these requirements by signing a written Quitclaim Deed to
Greg.

A similar requirement is found at Idaho Code s55-601 which requires that the
conveyance of real property must be in writing and signed to be valid.
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55-601. Conveyance - Mow made. -A conveyance of an estate in real
property may be made by an instrument in writing, subscribed by the
party disposing of the same.. ..The name of the grantee and his complete
mailing address must appear on such instrument.
the effect of a written conveyance of real property is that
As noted in I.C. §55-604
it is presumed that the Grantor intended to grant a fee simple title unless a lesser grant is
noted in the transfer document.

55-604. Fee presumed to pass. - A fee simple title is presumed to be
intended to pass by a grant of real property unless it appears from the
grant that a lesser estate was intended.
As noted in I.C. s55-606 the validity of such a grant is declared to be conclusive
against the Grantor except for a bona fide purchaser who has previously recorded a
transfer on the property.

-

55-606. Conclusiveness of conveyance - Bona fide purchasers.
Every grant or conveyance of an estate in real property is conclusive
against the grantor, also against every one subsequently claiming under
him, except a purchaser or encumbrancer, who in good faith, and for a
valuable consideration, acquires a title or lien by an instrument or valid
judgment lien that is first duly recorded.

These sections make the transfer conclusive against Ann because there was no
restriction or limitation in the deed and there was no other written agreement to the
contrary between Ann and Greg. This section operates as more than a presumption and
binds Ann conclusively to the deed which she transferred to Greg,
Other requirements are provided by statute in situations involving husbands and
provides that property conveyed by one spouse to the
wives. Idaho Code §32-906(2)
other is presumed to be the sole and separate property of the receiving spouse.
r.
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32-906. Community property - Income from separate and
community property.... - (2)Property conveyed by one spouse to the
other shall be presumed to be the sole and separate estate of the grantee
and only the grantor spouse need execute and acknowledge the deed.. . .
Additional rules are established by statute regarding property rights between
spouses and by marriage settlement agreements. Idaho Code s32-916 provides that
property rights between a husband and wife are controlled by provisions in that chapter
unless there is an enforceable marriage settlement agreement to the contraly.
32-916. Property rights governed by chapter. The property rights of
husband and wife are governed by this chapter, unless there is a marriage
settlement agreement entered into during marriage containing stipulations
contrary thereto.
The requirements for an enforceable marriage settlement agreement is provided
at Idaho Code s32-917 as follows:
32-917. Formalities required of marriage settlements. All contracts
for marriage settlement agreements must be in writing, and executed and
acknowledged or approved in like manner as conveyances of land are
required to be executed and acknowledged or proved.
In the present case the Quitclaim Deed signed by Ann Barrett to Ann and Greg
Barrett satisfies the requirements of this section. The transfer was in writing, and was
executed and acknowledged in the same manner as a conveyance of land, which were
noted above in Idaho Code s9-503 and 55-601.

A marriage settlement agreement must be recorded in the county recorder's office
where the real estate is located which in the present case was done by the closing agent.
32-918. Marriage settlements - record. ( I )When such contract is
acknowledged or proved, it must be recorded in the office of the recorder
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of every county in which any real estate may be situated which is granted
or affected by such contract.. ..
The recording of a conveyance of real property is constructive notice to
subsequent purchasers and mortgagees.

55-811. Record as notice - Every conveyance of real property
acknowledged or proved, and certified, and recorded as prescribed by law,
from the time it is filed with the recorder for record, is constructive notice
of the contents thereof to subsequent purchasers and mortgage(e)es.
A review of these Idaho statutes regarding transfers of real property and
conveyances between spouses and marriage settlement agreements indicates the
following conclusions:
1.

Ann satisfied all statutory requirements for a conveyance of real property to Greg.

I.C. 39-503 and 9-505; 55-601.
2.

It is presumed that Ann conveyed a fee simple title to Greg in his one-half

interest. I.C. 355-604.

3.

The transfer by Ann to Greg is conclusive against her and binding on any person

or entity subsequently acquiring an interest in the same property. I.C. 355-606.

4.

The transfer by Ann to Greg of a one-half interest in the property is presumed to

convey to him a separate interest in the property. I.C. s32-906(2).
5.

The transfer by Ann to Greg satisfied all the formalities of a marriage settlement

agreement because it was signed by Ann, acknowledged by a notary and recorded in
the county where the real property is located. I.C. 332-917, 918.
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6.

The loan agreement and the deed by Ann to Greg constitutes a marriage

settlement agreement between them in which a one-half interest in the property was
transferred to Greg and he accepted responsibility for payment of the loan. I.C. 932-

917, 918.
7.

There was no other marriage settlement agreement to the contrary which

reversed, limited, or restricted the transfer to Greg. I.C. 932-917.

8.

Pursuant to Idaho Code 932-916 there must be a counter marriage settlement

agreement, or a reverse Quitclaim Deed signed, acknowledged and recorded by Ann
and Greg in order to reverse or void the transfer to Greg.
The conclusion from this review of the controlling statutes for the present case is
that the transfer from Ann to Greg by Quitclaim Deed constitutes a valid and
enforceable transfer to Greg of a one-half interest in the Etna property. Such transfer is
"presumed to be valid and is "conclusive" against Ann.
iii. GREG SATISFIED HIS BURDEN OF PROOF BY CLEAR AND

CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT THE DEED TRANSMUTED ANN'S
SEPARATE PROPERTY TO COMMUNITY PROPERTY
The original burden of proof to show a transmutation of property during marriage
is on the person claiming such transmutation and it must be shown by clear and
convincing evidence. Ustick v. Ustick. 104 ldaho 215, 657 P.2d 1083. When that
evidence has been presented then the burden of persuasion shifts to the opposing party
to show sufficient evidence to the contrary. Bliss v. Bliss, 127 Idaho at 174;I.R.E. 301.
r.
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Greg satisfied his original burden of proof to show by clear and convincing evidence
that a transmutation occurred based on Ann Barrett signing a clear and unambiguous
Quitclaim Deed transferring a one-half interest in the Etna property to him. Such Deed
was required by a lending agency which granted a loan to Ann and Greg for refinancing
on her previous separate property. The Quitclaim Deed was recorded in the normal
course of the transaction. Completing these formalities satisfies the statutory
requirements for deeds and marriage settlement agreements and further creates a
presumption of validity which Ann must overcome in order to prevail.
Ann failed to provide any testimony to counter Greg's testimony except her own
statement that she did not intend to give Greg a one-half interest. She did not present
any reverse Quitclaim Deed, or a reverse marriage settlement agreement, or admissions
by Greg, or any other legitimate evidence. Therefore, Ann's failure to meet her burden
of persuasion means Greg's evidence is controlling and the trial judge's findings of facts
and conclusions should be upheld.

B. THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE PROHEISIITS TESTIMONY OF INTENT
IN THE PRESENT CASE.
Ann argues in her Brief on Appeal in Section B that even if the Hoskinson case
does not apply to the facts in the present case the court should still consider par01
evidence about the intent and circumstances of the transfer by Quitclaim Deed to Greg.
The claim for such argument is that when spouses are refinancing property it is different
than a formal marriage settlement agreement or transmutation agreement. This
c'
&-A
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argument is contrary to the provisions of Idaho Code 932-917 which defines what is
required for a formal marriage settlement agreement. As noted above, that requirement
is that it must be in writing, and acknowledged and recorded. Ann's argument proposes
another requirement to Idaho Code 932-917 that it must be lengthy and complex. Such
is contrary to the statutes of Idaho and would impose an unreasonable burden on
married parties in their dealings with each other.
i. A DEED DURING REFINANCING IS A VALID AND EFFECTIVE

METHOD TO TRANSMUTE PROPERTY DURING MARRIAGE AND IT
SATISFIES THE REQUHREMENTS FOR A MARRIAGE SEITLEMENT
AGREEMENT.
Ann argues that a Quitclaim Deed used in a refinancing situation should be
treated differently than a deed in a sale or purchase agreement by spouses. However,
the Quitclaim Deed to Greg and Ann will be treated the same as any other Quitclaim
Deed in relation to the rights of the Bank of Star Valley as lender, and for all subsequent
purchasers of the property, and for title insurance purposes on the property, and for
creditors of either Ann or Greg who may seek to use the Etna property as a resource for
payment of a debt, and for governmental tax entities who may seek to enforce payment
of taxes against the Etna property on behalf of either Ann or Greg. The purpose of the
recording of the real estate documents is to provide notice to the world of the claims to
ownership of the property. Ann knowingly signed the Quitclaim Deed and the legal
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ramifications of signing that Deed are effective as to all other persons and entities and
must be effective as to Greg and Ann also.
Ann argues that she did not understand the effect of a Quitclaim Deed and did
not really intend to convey a one-half interest in the Etna property to Greg by signing
the Quitclaim Deed. However, failing to read or understand a contract, is not a valid
defense. A similar argument was made in the recent case of Cristo Viene Pentecostal
Church v. Paz, 144 Idaho 304, 160 P.3d 743. (2007). In that case the agent for the
Plaintiff Church could not read English and thought he was signing a purchase contract
for real property. In fact the contract, which was written in English, was only a lease with
an option to purchase. The option date passed since the Plaintiff Church was not aware
of the option. The Supreme Court held that failure to read or understand a contract
when signing it is not an excuse. That is another way of stating the legal maxim that
"ignorance of the law is not a defense." See TR. V.11, P. 636, L. 20 to 24.
ii. REFINANCING OF SEPARATE PROPERTY BY A SPOUSE IS

SUBJECT TO THE SAME RULES AS IN OTHER REAL ESTATE
TRANSACTIONS.
Ann argues that the law regarding parol evidence should be different in her case
between spouse's, than it is in other cases of real estate transactions because refinancing
is inherently ambiguous. Greg argues that the same law should apply in this case as
applies to other real estate transactions. The case of Bliss u. Bliss, supra, dictates that
Greg's argument and the trial judge's decision in the present case are correct. Like in the
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present case, in @
a spousel
signed
&
a deed to the other spouse and later argued he did
not really intend to transfer the property to the spouse. The Idaho Supreme Court held
that the grantor spouse was bound by the deed and was not allowed to disclaim intent
at a later date. In &
B

one quitclaim deed was sufficient to transmute property to the

other spouse, without any other written documentation.
The case of Griffinv. Griffin.102Idaho 858, 642 P.2d 949 is instructive on when

a refinance of separate property during marriage will not cause a transmutation. In that
case husband refinanced his separate property during marriage. The wife signed the
promissory note and the Deed of Trust for the new loan. However, the husband did not
sign a deed to wife to place her on the title as part of the refinancing. Based on those
facts the Court of Appeals held there was no transmutation, noting there was no deed to
the wife and there could be no oral transmutation.
In the present case there is a clear and unambiguous deed from Ann to Ann and
Greg, so the opposite conclusion from

Griffin would

be reached that there was a

transmutation during refinancing. Ann is then left to argue that there was some other
oral agreement that the deed would not really apply. This argument that there was an
oral transmutation agreement was rejected in Griffin during refinancing by the spouse.
Ann further argues that if the parol evidence rule applies it would create an
injustice and the clear and convincing evidence rule of Ustick v. Ustick would be
eradicated, but only in "refinance cases" between spouses. Another way of stating this
premise is that if one spouse in a refinancing case feels an agreement was unfair then
,-I.;

f',
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parol evidence should be allowed so the judge can determine fairness by reviewing the
intent and surrounding circumstances of an agreement. Such an application would be
contrary to the Idaho statutes regarding real estate transactions and transfers between
spouses as noted above. The effect of such an argument would be that Ann should be
allowed to undo one portion of the transaction that was to her detriment even though
that part, Greg joining as a responsible party on the loan, was necessary in order to
accomplish the new financing which was a benefit to Ann. That eliminates the right of
Greg Barrett to decide whether or not he would sign on the promissory note and
assume responsibility therefore if he was not going to also be a part owner of the
property which was being refinanced. Ann should not be allowed to undo a transaction
which was to her detriment and retain all of the benefits from the same transaction.

C. ANN'S QUITCLAIM DEED DURING REFINANCING CONVEYED A
PRESENT TITLE TO GREG.
Ann argues in Part C of Defendant's Brief on Appeal that the recent case of
Barmore v. Perrone, 145 Idaho 340, 179 P.3d 3 0 3 (2008)should allow her to present
testimony on intent because the deed was never "delivered". In that case the husband
signed a Quitclaim Deed to his wife on his separate real property. He claimed the
purpose was to avoid probate if he died, so that the deed could transfer ownership to his
wife at that time. He claimed there was no intent to deliver the deed and make it
presently effective rather than at his death. The case was decided at the trial court level
on a Motion for Summary Judgment. The magistrate had refused to consider an
r

r-
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Affidavit from the husband reciting the above facts about his intent to avoid probate and
the lack of delivery of the deed. The Affidavit further stated that the husband and wife
had previously prepared a similar deed from husband to wife on other property
husband had owned in California, and this was also done with the intent to be effective
at his death to avoid probate. The reason given by the magistrate was that the Affidavit
had been filed late and would not be considered on a Motion for Reconsideration. The
Idaho Supreme Court held that the magistrate erred in not considering the Affidavit on
the Motion for Reconsideration. The Supreme Court explained that delivery of the deed
is necessary for the deed to be valid and therefore the factual issue was properly raised
by the husband's Affidavit. As a result the summary judgment was incorrect and must be
reconsidered by the trial court.
In Barmore v. Perrone, supra, the Idaho Supreme Court ruled that the husband's
claim that he did not "intend" the deed to be effective when signed, was the same as
claiming he did not "deliver" the deed at the time of signing, since the husband claimed
it was only intended to be "delivered" when he died in order to avoid probate. Ann
never raised the issue in the five day trial about whether the Quitclaim Deed was
"delivered to Greg. She only testified that she did not "intend" to give Greg a one-half
interest in the Etna property.
In Barmore the deed was never recorded in the county recorder's office. in the
present case Ann's Quitclaim Deed to Greg was recorded in the county recorder's office.
The recording of a deed creates a presumption of delivery. Hartlev v. Stibor, 96 Idaho
r r; r
i
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157, 525 P.2d 352 (1974);Hiddleson v. Cahoon, 37 Idaho 142.214 P. 1042 11923);
Idaho Trust Co., v. Eastman. 43 Idaho 142,249 P. 890 11926). In Hartlev v. Stibor, the
ldaho Supreme Court also applied the presumptions in I.C. s55-604 that a fee simple
title is presumed to be intended to pass in a deed, and in I.C. s55-604 that a deed of
conveyance is conclusive against the grantor. The Court then reversed the trial court
which had found the grantor did not intend a delivery of the deed, even though it was
recorded and in the possession of the grantee.
In the present case the title company returned the recorded Quitclaim Deed to
Ann and Greg Barrett and it was in their possession as indicated by the recording
certification on the deed introduced as Plaintiff's Exhibit 23. Possession of a deed by the
grantee also creates a presumption of delivery. Hartlev v. Stibor, supra. Since both
recording and possession of the deed occurred, delivery of the deed is undisputed. Ann
did not claim at trial that there was no delivery of the deed. Therefore, the argument
from Barmore u. Perrone does not apply in this case.

CONCLUSION
Greg requests that this Court uphold the decision of the trial judge, made after a
five day trial with full opportunity to consider the witnesses' testimony and the trial
exhibits. This Court should uphold the trial court's decision that Greg met his burden of
proof of clear and convincing evidence through the plain and unambiguous Quitclaim
Deed from Ann to Greg and that Ann failed to meet her burden of persuasion that
somehow the Deed she signed was not valid.
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Telephone (208) 525-8792
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Attorneys for Defendant, Ann Marie Barrett
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
GREGORY PAUL BARRETT,
PlaintiffIRespondent,
vs.

)
)

Case No. CV-05-4852

)
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ANN MARIE BARRETT,
DefendantlAppeliant.

)
)
)
)

COMES NOW, DefendantIAppellant, ANN MARIE BARRETT, by and through her
attorney of record, Aaron J. Woolf, Esq., of the law firm of THOMPSON SMITH WOOLF &
ANDERSON, PLLC, and hereby submits her Reply Brief on Appeal, as follows'
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I. ARGUMENT

.

The statutory arguments advanced by Greg are not dispositive of the issue
before this Court.
Greg argues in section V.1.A.ii. of Plaintiff's Brief on Appeal, that he should prevail

as the quitclaim deed from Ann to Greg complied with the statutory requirements for
conveyances of real property and transfers between spouses. Essentially, Greg makes
three (3) different statutory arguments. First, he argues that pursuant to ldaho Code s55601, et seq., the quitclaim deed is conclusive against Ann. Second, Greg argues that
ldaho Code (j32-906(2) applies to this case, and since Ann signed the quitclaim deed, it is
presumed that she conveyed to Greg a separate property interest in the Etna property.
And finally, Greg argues that pursuant to ldaho Code s32-916, et seq., Ann's execution of
the quitclaim deed is a valid marital settlement agreement which transmutted Ann's
separate property into community property. All of these arguments must fail.
ldaho Code (j55-606 does state that "a conveyance of an estate in real property is
conclusive against the grantor". However, this rule, alone, does not answer the question in
a marital, refinancing, situation.

First of ail, as stated previously, in Hoskinson v.

kioskinson_, 139 ldaho 448 (2003), the ldaho Supreme Court upheld the Magistrate's
determination that despite a Deed having been executed by husband, whereby he
conveyed his separate property interest in real property to himself and his wife, during a
refinance, the property remained husband's separate property.

Thus, the facts in

Hoskinsori, which are nearly identical to the factual situation in this case, creates an
exception to the general rule outlined in ldaho Code 555-606. Second of all, in cases
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involving spouses, in order to prove a transmutation of property or a gift, the burden is on
the party making the claim to prove the intent in question by clear and convincing evidence.
Ustick v. Ustick, 104 Idaho 215, 222 (1983). As argued in Defendant's Brief on Appeal, in
the refinancing scenario, involving spouses, the Court must look to parol evidence t o
determine whether a transmutation or a gift, has been proven by clear and convincing
evidence. If it is not, then there is a great injustice done to the clear and convincing
evidentiary standard, regarding transmutations and gifts. Again, it is simply not right for a
spouse who is refinancing a debt on hislher separate property, to lose hislher separate
property, simply because they signed a quitclaim deed granting the property to both
spouses. The Court must look to the surrounding circumstances and the intent of the
parties' to determine, during the refinancing, whether the spouse who signed the quitclaim
deed intended to create a community property interest, or rather, as is the case here (and
in Hoskinson), whether the spouse was merely attempting to refinance a loan owed on her
separate property, with no intentto transfer an interest to both spouses. Third, Barmore v.
Perrone, 179 P.3d 303 (2008) is dispositive, as despite a properly executed quitclaim deed
from husband t o wife, the intent of the parties' was reviewed to determine whether delivery
of the deed was intended; or in other words, whetherthe grantor had the "intent to convey
immediately". The Court did not only look to the deed, in Barmore.
Idaho Code 532-906(2) simply does not apply, as it refers t o property being
transferred to the grantee spouse as hislher sole and separate property. It says nothing
about community property. The factual scenario in this case deals with a purported
transfer of Ann's separate property to community property, and not Greg's separate
Defendant's Reply Brief
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property.

Even if ldaho Code 332-906'(2) applies to this case, it merely creates a

presumption, when the deed is signed, ldaho Code g32-906(2) (2007) and Bliss v. Bliss,
127 ldaho 170, 174 (1995). This shifts the burden to the other party, pursuant to IRE Rule
301, to come forward with evidence to rebut the presumption, although the party who is
seeking to prove the transmutation continues to carry the burden of persuasion. Blisg at
174. The effect of the statutory presumption under IRE Rule 301 is that the party in whose
favor the presumption operates is relieved from having to adduce further evidence of the
presumed fact until the opponent introduces substantial evidence of the nonexistence of
the fact. Id_ Here, Greg met his initial burden, with the quitclaim deed, and thus the
presumption of ldaho Code g32-906(2) would work in his favor. Thereafter, it would be
Ann's obligation to come forward with evidence to rebut the presumption. She can clearly
do so. All of the evidence illustrates that there was no intent to transmute Ann's separate
properiy into community property. Ann needed to refinance the Countrywide debt, on her
sole and separate property, when she sold a portion of her Etna property to the Lovelands.
During the refinancing, she was handed dozens of documents to sign, and she did not
even remember signing the quitclaim deed. Ann had absolutely no intention of giving Greg
any interest in her separate property. Ann would not have signed the quitclaim deed had
she known that she was giving Greg a one-half interest. Ann and Greg did not discuss the
possibility that Ann was giving Greg a one-half interest in the Etna property before or after
Ann signed the quitclaim deed. In fact, the first time Greg brought up the issue that he had

a one-half interest in the Etna property, was after the divorce complaint was filed. Greg
agreed with ail of the aforementioned facts. Greg offered no testimony in support of his
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claim that Ann's separaie property was transmilled, other than the quitclaim deed. All of
this evidence must be considered, despite the fact that it may be parol evidence, for all of
the reasons argued by Ann in Defendant's Brief on Appeal. When it is considered, it is
clear that Ann has rebutted the presumption. Then, Greg is left with the burden of
persuasion, and he cannot meet this burden, as all of the evidence is in Ann's favor
Greg's last statutory argument is that the execution of the quitclaim deed is a valid
marital settlement agreement, and thus, Ann transmuted her separate property into
community property. Obviously, Ann disagrees with this argument. All of the reasons for
her disagreement are oiitlined in Defendant's Brief on Appeal, and they need not be
addressed, again

2.

Barmore v. Perrone requires the Magistrate to look to parol evidence in this
c a s e , and this issue was raised bv Ann at trial.
Ann cited to Barmore v. Perr-,

179 P.3d 303 (2008), for the proposition that she

did not intend to convey the property to Greg (i.e., she did not deliver the deed). Greg
argues that this issue was not raised by Ann at trial. This argument fails. The ldaho
Supreme Court in Barmore addressed the identical argument, and found that the issue had
not been raised for the first time on appeal, and thus was to be considered.
Specifically, the Idaho Supreme Court stated as follows:
However, Barmore argues that Perrone has raised this issue
for the first time on appeal, and that it therefore was not
preserved for appeal. Barmore is incorrect. Perrone argued to
the magistrate court that the intent necessary to effect
conveyance of the deed was lacking:
It is therefore unequivocally clear that Mr. Perrone
neither intended a gift or to transmute, presently, his
Defendant's Reply Brief on Appeal
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Id.

interest in the Star, ldaho property ... . Mr. Perrone
clearly never intended to either gift or transmute his
current interest in the Star, ldaho property but rather to
duplicate the Simi Valley, California property (where a
quitclaim deed was executed between Mr. Perrone and
Mrs. Barmore) and where the proceeds were used to
obtain the community property residence in Star, ldaho
where again Mr. Perrone executed a quitclaim deed to
Mrs. Barmore that would only become effective upon
his demise, not upon her request for divorce. To
validate a transmutation upon, these circumstances
permits one party to mislead the other party and unfairly
gain ownership of property that clearly never intended
(sic) to be immediately transmuted.
That argument is identical to an argument that delivery was
lacking, since ldaho law has made clear that "delivery" and
"intent to convey immediately" are synonymous terms.
Id. Ann, throughout the trial, testified, and argued that she did not intend to convey the
Etna property to Greg. Specifically, Ann testified that she had absolutely no intention of
giving Greg any interest in her separate property; that she and Greg did not discuss the
possibility that Ann was giving Greg a one-half interest in the Etna property before or aRer
Ann signed the quitclaim deed; that the first time Greg brought up the issue that he had a
one-half interest in the Etna property, was after the divorce complaint was filed; that she
signed numerous documents at the closing, but she did not recall signing the quitclaim
deed which was admitted as Plaintiff's exhibit 23; and that if Ann had known she was giving
Greg an interest, she would not have signed the quitclaim deed. Ann also argued, in
Defendant's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, which was filed on July
30,2007, that she had no intention of conveying the Etna property to Greg (see pages 17

and 18). Thus, as she argued that she had no intent to immediately convey the property to
Defendant's Reply Brief on Appeal
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Greg, she argued thatthe deed had not been "delivered". The issuewas raised below, and
Barmore applies to this case.
Greg states in his brief that the deed was never recorded in Barmore. This is not
true. Nowhere in Barmore is it stated that the deed was not recorded. Thus, the argument
made by Greg to distinguish Barmore, must fail. Furthermore, the recording of a deed,
does not mean that the deed was "delivered". Hartley v. Stibor, 96 ldaho 157, 160 (1974).
Recordation of a deed merely creates a presumption of delivery.

The key issue in

determining whether a deed has been delivered (or whether the grantor had the "intent to
convey immediately") is the intent of the grantor to pass immediate and present title to the
property.

Id. and Barmore.

And as stated in Defendant's Brief on Appeal, "a deed never

shows upon its face nor by the terms thereof a delivery, and parol evidence thereof must
necessarily be admitted when the question of delivery arises." Barmore (citing to Whitney
v. Dewey, 10 ldaho 63, 655, 80 P. 1117, 1121 (1905).). Thus, in this case, regardless of
the fact that the quitclaim deed Ann signed was recorded, the Magistrate should have
looked to parol evidence to determine whether a delivery (or "the intent to convey
immediately") occurred.

I!. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, Ann requests that this Court reverse the Magistrate's ruling that
the Etna property and the funds held in Ann's attorney's trust account were transmuted
into community property. Ann would further request, that this Court find, as a matter of
law, that there was no transmutation, and thus the Etna property and the funds held in
Ann's attorney's trust account are her separate property. Ann would also request that
Defendant's Reply Brief on Appeal
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the issue of the community property interest in Ann's separate property be remanded to
the Magistraie for determination, based upon ihe evidence already presented.
Respectfully submitted this =day

Defendant's Reply Brief on Appeal

Pg. 10
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On July 7,2008, at 10:OO A.M., the parties brought oral argument on appeal on this
matter for hearing before the Honorable Jon J. Shindurling, District Judge, sitting in open couit at
Idaho Falls, Idaho.
Mr. Daniel Williams, Court Reporter, and Ms. Grace Walters, Deputy Court. Clerk, were
present.
Mr. Royce Lee appeared on behalf of the plaintiff. Mr. Aaron Woolf appeared on behalf
of the defendant.
Mr. Woolf argued in mitigation.
Mr. Lee argued in aggravation.
Mr. Woolf then presented rebuttal argument.
The Court will consider whether the Parole Evidence Rule will apply in this case and
whether the case should be remanded back to the magistrate, and will issue an order after further
research into the matter.
r~r; r.
L. u \)

Court was thus adjourned.

c: Royce Lee
Aaron Woolf

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

Case No. CV-05-4852

Gregory Paul Barrett,

OPINION AND DECISION
ON APPEAL

PlaintiffIRespondei~t,
vs.
Ann Marie Barrett,
DefendantlAppellant.

This is an appeal from the Magistrate Court of the Seventh Judicial District in and for the
Coullty of Bom~eville,Honorable Earl Blower, Magistrate Judge. Am1 Marie Barrett appeals from
the September 11,2007 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Property and Debt Division and
Attorneys Fees which found that the signing of a Quitclaim Deed transmuted an Etna, Wyoming
property into colnmunity property.
1.

FAGTUALANDPROCEDURALBACKGROUND
The parties were married onNovember 1,1997. Respondent filed for divorce on August 29,
2005. A trial for divorce was held on June 18,2007 through June 22,2007. A Rule 54(b) Decree of
Divorce was entered on July 3,2007 which divorced the parties effective June 22,2007.
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All11 acquired a property in Etna, Wyoming in her first marriage to Kevin Spencer. In her
1996 divorce from Spencer, An11 was awarded the Etna property. Spencer signed two quitclaim
deeds giving Ann the sole interest in the Etna property.
In August 1999 Aim sold part of the Etna property to Eric and Dawn Loveland. Ann sold to
the Lovelands two and one-half acres, including her marital residence, for $88,500. Ann transferred
the acreage and the home through a Warranty Deed. When Ann sold the property to the Lovelands,
she owed Countrywide $122,355.54 on a loan secured by the Etna property. Ann applied the
proceeds of the sale to the loan, leaving a balance of $34,000. An11 was required to pay off the loan
during the closing of the sale of the property. In order to do so, A m and Greg acquired a loan
through the Bank of Star Valley for $35,881.55 and paid off the loan. At the time of the divorce, the
debt owed to the bank of Star Valley was $23,086.
At the closing for the sale of the property and the new loan, A m and Greg signed dozens of
documents related to the loan. Though they had the opportunity to examine the documents, neither of
them read all of the documents. Among the documents was a quitclaim deed on the remainder of the
Etna land, transfening the land to her and Greg. Alm says that she does not remember signing the
quitclaim deed, though she admits that she signed the document as the docwnent bears her signature.
In December 2005, after Greg had filed for divorce, Ann sold 2 acres of the Etnapropevty for
$49,322.19 and improveme~ltson her property. $42,668.24 of the proceeds of that sale were placed
in Ann's attorney's trust account. At the time of the divorce, the remaining property was appraised
at $350,000.
In the court's September 1 I, 2007 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Judge Blower
found that the signing of the quitclaim deed transmuted-theEtna property, whichwas Am's separate
property.

,-'-

C.
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Ann filed a Notice of Appeal on September 14,2007.
On May 14,2008 Ann filed her Brief on Appeal.
On June 12,2008 Greg filed his Brief on Appeal.
On Jul7,2008 the parties brought oral argument on appeal on this matter. The cowt took the
appeal under advisement at that time.
The Court has reviewed the record of the proceedings below and provides the following
analysis and decision.
11.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

District Court review of a Magistrate's decision is governed by Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure 83(a)-(2). All appeals from the Magistrates Division shall be heard by the District Court
as an appellate proceeding unless the District Court orders a trial de novo. I.R.C.P. 83(b). This
Court has not ordered that this matter be heard as a trial de novo, and therefore, this review is upon
the record and has occurred in the same manner and upon the same standards of review as an appeal
from the District Court to the Supreme Court. I.R.C.P. 83(u).
In a District Court review of amagistrate court's ruling, the findings of the magistrate judge
will be upheld if supported by substantial, competent though conflicting evidence. Barton v. Barton,
132 Idaho 394,396,973 P.2d 746,748 (1999) citing Smith v. Smith, 124 Idaho 431,436,860 P.2d
634,639 (1993). The weight to be given evidence is within the trial court's province and will not be
set aside unless clearly erroneous. I.R.C.P. 52(a); Tentinger v. McPhelers, 132 Idaho 620,977 P.2d
234 (Ct.App.1999); Magic Valley Truck Brokers, Inc. v. Meyer, 133 Idaho 110, 982 P.2d 945
(Ct.App.1999); and Holley v. Holley, 128 Idaho 503,915 P.2d 733 (Ct.App.1996). Ifthefindingare
supported, the collclusions of law then must be examined as to whether they are founded on a proper
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application of legal principles. Desfosses v. Desfosses, 120 Idaho 354, 356, 815 P.2d 1094, 1096
(1991), I5entges v. Hentges, 115 Idaho 192,194,765 P.2d 1094, 1096 (Ct. App. 1988).
The characterization of property is subject to h e sound discretion of the trial court, and should
be upheld in the absence of a clear showing of an abuse of discretion. Matter ofEliasen's Estate, 105
Idaho 234 (1983). The District Court exercises free review over questions of law. Stevens v. Stevens,
135 Idaho 224,227 (2000).
The party challenging the findings has the burden of showing error, and the appellate cout will
review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. Martsch v. Nelson, 109 Idaho
95,100,705 P.2d 1050,1055 (Ct. App. 1985). Error may not bepresumed onappeal, andanappellant
must make an affirmative showing of such error to prevail. Carpenfey v. X.R. Cattle Co., Inc., 108
Idaho 602,701 P.2d 222 (1985).

111.

ISSUES ON APPEAL
Did the magistrate err in finding that the Quitclaim Deed executed by Ann, during a refinance,
transmuted the Etna property from Ann's separate property to community property?
IV.
ANALYSIS
Appellant argues that the Magistrate failed to uphold the clear and convincii~gstandard
for transmuting separate property by enforcing the parol evidence rule. Ustick v. Uslick, 104
Idaho 2 15, 222 (1 983) requires, "where it is asserted, as in this case, that a spouse intended to
transmute property or to make a gift, the burden is on the party urging the assertion to prove the
intent in question by clear and convincing evidence."

.-

Under the pmol evidence rule, when a coiltract has been reduced to a writing that the
parties intend to be a final statement of their agreement, is not admissible to vary, contradict, or
p,,

!..

&Lid
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enlarge the terms of the written contract. Simons v. Sinzons, 134 Idaho 824, 828 (2000).
Par01 evidence may be considered to aid the trial court in determining the intent of the
drafter of a document if an ambiguity exists. Matter ofEstafe of Kirk, 127 Idaho 8 17 (1 995).
Respondent argues that the quitclaim deed is clear and unambiguous and that it complies
with the various Idaho statutory requirement s for conveyances of real property and transfers
between spouses.
At trial, Appellant urged the magistrate to adopt the reasoning he had applied in the
case of Hoskinson Y. Hoskinson, 139 Idaho 448 (2003). The facts in Hoskins are similar to those
at hand, except in Hoskiizson the parties had signed two quitclaim deeds. In his findings of fact
from Irloslcinson, the magistrate considered par01 evidence when he held:
[Tlhe parties offered conflicting evidence of tlie intent behind the quitclaim deeds.
Elizabeth testified that Reed asked her to sign a quitclaim deed to facilitate the
financing and that she refused to sign uiltil Reed agreed to sign a deed conveying
the property to her and Reed. Reed denied that allegation. He testified he signed
the quitclaim deed simply because the lender presented it to him during the loan
closing, that he signed it along with many other papers the lender presented to
him, and that he had no intent to transmute his property into colnmunity property.
Reed notes that he alone signed the promissory note for the new loan. Under
these circumstances, the court finds that Elizabeth has not proved a transmutation
by clear and convincing evidence. The evidence did not establish that Reed
intended to make a gift to the comnunity. The evidence did not establish whether
the deed to Reed and Elizabeth was signed before or after the deed to Reed. As
noted above, Elizabeth damaged her credibility with her lack of candor during her
testimony on other issues; therefore, the court is inclined to believe Reed's
testimony on the issue.

Hoskinson, 139 Idaho at 459-60.
The Idaho Supreme Court upheld the magistrate's decisioil in Hoskinson that the
holder of a quitclaim deed "failed to sustain her burden of proving a transmutation." Id. at

Appellant contends that the magistrate should have considered her intent when
rJ??
L*
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she signed the quitclaim deed, as tlte magistrate did in Hoskinson. In Hoskinson, the
magistrate considered the defendant's testimony that he only signed the quitclaini deed
because "tlie lender presented it to him during the loan closing, that he signed it along
with maiy other papers the lender presented to him, and that he had no intent to
transmute his property into cominunity property." Id. at 359. In this case tlie magistrate
refused to consider such evidence in detenniniilg the characterizatioil of the property.
Respondent argues that Hoskinson is factuallydistinguishable from this case. The
respondent contends that there was an ambiguity in the quitclaim deeds in the Hoskinson
case not found here. However, the Hoskinson case did not iilvolve ambiguity in the
document itsele the ambiguity arose from the circumstances surrounding the separate
quitclai~iideeds, including the existence of two deeds. Any ambiguity in this case would
also arise from the circumstaices surrounding the quitclaim deed; the magistrate found
that the quitclaim deed itself was unambiguous.
Appellant also cites to the case of G r f j n v. G r f j n , 102 Idaho 858, (Ct. App.
1982), where the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed a magistrate's opinion finding that $10

trailsmutatioil had occurred even though the parties had signed a loan agreement stating
that the title to the property would vest in both parties. The court in GrifJin explained that
"the existence of the plaintiff's signature on the deed of trust in all likelihood can be
explained away as a precautionary measure required by a prudent creditor." Griffin, 102
Idaho at 861.
Gviffin is factually differentiable froin this case. As Respondent points out, the

court in G r v j n held that there was no transmutation because there was no deed to the
wife, not because of ambiguity in a deed. Respondent argues that the reasoning behind
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Grrjrjn would demand the finding of a transmutation in this case, where Appellant signed
a deed. However, the finding in GvifJin is not based on the existence or nonexistence of a
deed, but rather in the lack of clear and convincing evidence that a transmutation took
place. The court explained that the statements on the loan application explicitly assigning
the parties to a joint tenancy "offer some support to appellant's translnutation argument,
but they are not predominant." Id.
Respondent argues that Bliss v. Bliss, 127 Idaho 170 (1995) is a more accurate
comparison to this case. In Bliss, there is no trallsmutation of separate property to
community property. Instead, in Bliss the husband conveyed his interest in community
property to the wife through a quitclaim deed. Bliss at 173-74. This conveyance of
property is ruled by I.C. 5 32-906(2) which creates a

that the conveyed

property is separate. The court held that the quitclaim deed was unambiguous and that the
conveyance was valid. Iiowever, the presulnption in I.C.

5 32-906(2) is wildly different

from the Ustick standard which requires clear and convincing evidence of intent to
transmute separate property into commu~lityproperty. Additionally, the appellant in Bliss
claimed to have conveyed his interest to avoid taxation; the conveyance did not arise out
of a refinancing arrangement.
Similarly, the case of Hull v. Hull, 116 Idaho 483 (1989), also cited by
Respondent, refused to allow par01 evidence in a case where the parties had received a
home and the deed had been unambiguous. The husband's grandparents had given the
parties a home, accompanied by a deed that read "for value received." Hall at 484. The
magistrate had considered testimony from the husband's gratldmotller that the
conveyance was intended as a giR, and the Idaho Supreme Court remanded the case back

OPINION AND DECISION ON APPEAL

with the instruction to ignore the parol evidence testimony. Id. Again, the Hall case did
not deal wit11 the transmutation of separate property into community property and had
nothing to do with a refinancing agreement. Significantly, the Hall case, like the other
cases cited by Respondent, does not invoke the high demands of the clear and convincing
standard Usticlc requires.
Appellant appears to argue for a standard requiring courts to examine parol evidence
whenever there is a conveyance of properly related to 3 refinancing situation. This court does not
find in the caselaw any hint of a mandate requiring courts to always consider parol evidence

that courts are granted much broader leeway in considering parol
However, it is apparent
evidence in situations where an otherwise unambiguous document is part of a refinancing
situation. In such situations, parties often sign many documents that neither side prepared. These
documents are generally prepared by a third party seelting to protect its interests alone. Appellant
presented testimony and evidence that she did not intend to grant a one half interest to
Respondent and that she signed the document simply because the lender presented it to her. In
such situations, the intentions of the palties are rarely clear simply from reading a document
prepared by a third party. Intention of a transmutation can only be shown by clear and convincing
evidence. Here, the magistrate should have considered parol evidence before determining that
there was clear and convincing evidence of a transmutation 01separate to community property.
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v.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the magistrate is reversed. The court remands to the magistrate for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated this

&

/

n

day of August, 2008.
I

hindurling
Judge
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BONNEVILLE COUNTY

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

GREGORY PAUL BARRETT,
Plaintifl,
vs .
ANN MARIE BARRETT,

1

Defendant.

Case No. CV-05-4852
ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW ON PROPERTY
AND DEBT DIVISION
FOLLOWING REMAND

In his August 29, 2008 Opinion and Decision on Appeal, District Judge Jon J.
Shinduriing remanded this case with instructions to consider par01 evidence in
determining whether the plaintiff proved a transmutation of the "Etna property" by clear
and convincing evidence. Applying that standard, the court concludes that the plaintiff
did not meet his burden of proof. Although the defendant signed a quitclaim deed
purporting to convey the Etna property to herself and the plaintiff, other evidence

ADDITIONAL FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS
FOLLOWING REMAND
p , ,.&*
S;u 1

1

indicated that she did not intend a gift to the plaintiff. That evidence includes the
following: (1) the defendant's testimony that she did not intend to give the plaintiff an
interest in the property but signed the deed only because it was presented to her by a
lender as part of a refinancing process; (2) the relatively sinall amount of the refinance
loan ($34,512) coinpared to the fair market value of the property (at least $350,000); (3)
the absence of any discussion between the parties about any intention to ~nalcea gift; and
(4) the defendant's testimony that she continued to consider repayment of the refinance
loan to be her responsibility.
Because the court now concludes that the Etna property and the proceeds from the
Wyonling 100 sale are the defendant's separate property, the defendant's separate
property estate n~ustreimburse the co~nrnunityestate $13,772 for the reduction in the
principal of the original and refinance mortgage loans accoinplished with the use of
colnmunity funds. Additionally, the defendant, not tlle community, should be solely
responsible for the repayment of the refinance loan.
The court directs the defendant's attorney, Mr. Woolf, to prepare an amended
judgment consistent with these findings and conclusions.
Dated September 17, 2008.

ADDITIONAL FINDINGS & CONCLU,SI.Q&3 FOLLOWING REMAND
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day of September 2008,I served a true and correct copy
of the foregoing document on the persons listed below by mailing, with the correct
postage thereon, by facsimile, or by causing the same to be hand delivered.
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Deputy Court Clerk

Aaron J. Woolf
P.O. Box 50160
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
FAX (208) 524-5451
Royce B. Lee
770 South Woodruff Avenue
Idaho Falls, ID 83401
FAX (208) 524-205 1
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Box
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US Mail

I? Hand Delivery

/

6 Courthouse Box
FAX

U US Mail

El Iland Delivery

ADDITIONAL FINDINGS & CONCLUSI&)$$y,FOLLOWING REMAND
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AARON J. WOOLF
ldaho State Bar #5791
THOMPSON SMITH WOOLF &ANDERSON, PLLC
3480 Merlin Drive
P.O. Box 50160
ldaho Falls, ID 83405
Telephone (208) 525-8792
Fax (208) 525-5266
Attorneys for Defendant, Ann Marie Barrett.
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
MAGISTRATES DIVISION
GREGORY PAUL BARRETT,
Plaintiff,
VS.

ANN MARIE BARRETT,
Defendant.

)
)
)

Case No. CV-05-4852

1

MOTION TO RECONSIDER

)
)
)
)
)

COMES NOW, Defendant, Ann Marie Barrett, by and through her attorney of
record, Aaron J. Woolf, Esq., of the law firm of THOMPSON SMITH WOOLF &
ANDERSON, PLLC, and hereby moves this Court for to reconsider its Addifional
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law on Property and Debt Division Following Remand,
which was entered on September 17, 2008. This Motion is based upon the Court file,
and I.R.C.P. Rule lI(a)(Z)(B), 52(b), and 59(e). In support thereof, Defendant argues
and requests as follows:

This Court found, in its Additional Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law on
Property and Debt Division Following Remand, which was entered on September 17,
2008, that the proceeds held in Ann's attorney's trust account (proceeds for the
Wyoming 100, LLC in the amount of $42,668.24) are Ann's separate property. As the
Court will recall, the parties paid for community expenses in the amount of $6,653.70,
out of these funds, during the pendency of the action. The expenses incurred, were as
follows: $1,500.00 to Dr. Lindsey for the custody evaluation; $1,480.56 to GMAC
Mortgage for payments on the 140 N. Adam property; $300.00 to Dr. Lindsey for the
custody evaluation; $600.00 to Dr. Lindsey for the custody evaluation; $2,433.00 to the
ldaho State Tax Commission for the parties' taxes; $450.00 to Amy Sheets for
mediation; $6.37 to Zip Print for copies; and $33.77 to Zip Print for copies.

See

testimony and see Plaintiff's exhibit 31.
A debt incurred during marriage is presumed to be a community debt. Gardner
v. Gardner, 107 ldaho 660, 662 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984). When separate funds of one
spouse are used for the benefit of the community, such as payment of debt arising from
acquisition of community property, the separate estate is entitled to reimbursement of
the amount expended (including the interest portion), absent clear and convincing
evidence that a gift of separate funds was made or intended. Ustick v. Ustick, 104
ldaho 215 (Idaho Ct. App. 1983). Although there is no case directly holding that a
spouse's separate estate is entitled to be reimbursed for contributions made to the
community estate, regardless of whether the payment was related to an underlying
asset, attorney Bruce Collier has written a very scholarly and thorough discussion of
community and separate reimbursement claims in divorce actions, which article was
MOTION TO RECONSIDER
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published in The Advocate, September, 2002 Edition, p. 14, and attached as exhibit A
to Defendant's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law which was filed on
July 30, 2007. Mr. Collier concludes that "when the separate estate contributes to the
community estate in a way that benefits the community estate, even if no specific
community property is improved or equity in any community asset is enhanced,
reimbursement for the amount contributed is allowed unless a gift is established." In his
article, Mr. Collier cites to ldaho authorities to support his conclusion. And finally, it has
been held that the community is entitled to reimbursement for Husband's separate tax
liability paid by the community during marriage. Swanson v. Swanson, 134 ldaho 512
(2000).
Based upon the above legal authority, the community should be ordered to
reimburse Ann's separate estate in the amount of $6,653.70.
Oral argument is requested.
DATED thiGay

MOTION TO RECONSIDER

of September, 2008.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am a licensed attorney in ldaho, with my office in
ldaho Falls, and that on theaday

of September, 2008, 1 served a true and correct

copy of the following-described document on the parties listed below, by mailing, with
the correct postage thereon, or by causing the same to be hand delivered
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PARTIES SERVED:
Royce B. Lee, Esq.
770 South Woodruff Avenue
ldaho Falls, ID 83401
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Royce B. Lee, P.A.
Attorney at Law
770South Woodruff Avenue
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83401
Telephone: (208)
524-2652
Facsimile: (208)
524-2051
Idaho State Bar #I691
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
GREGORY PAUL BARRETT,
Piaintiff/Appellant,

ANN MARIE BARRETT,

)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-05-4852
NOTICE OF APPEAL

)
)

TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, ANN MARIE BARRETT, AND THE
PARTY'S ATTORNEY, AARON WOOLF OF THOMPSON, SMITH, WOOLF &
ANDERSON, PLLC, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:

1.

The above named Appellant, Gregory Paul Barrett, appeals against the above
named Respondent, Ann Marie Barrett, to the Idaho Supreme Court from the
Opinion and Decision on Appeal entered in the above entitled action on the

29" day of August, 2008,the Honorable Judge Shindurling presiding.

NOTICE OF APPEAL -1

2.

That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the
judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders
,
under and pursuant to Rule l l ( a ) ( 2 ) I.A.R.

3.

A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the appellant then
intends to assert in the appeal; provided, any such list of issues on appeal
shall not prevent the Appellant from asserting other issues on appeal:
a. Whether the District Court Judge on appeal erred by remanding the case
to the trial court with instructions to consider par01 evidence on whether a
Quitclaim Deed, by Ann Barrett of her separate property to Greg Barrett
and Ann Barrett as husband and wife, constituted a valid transmutation of
her property to community property.

4.

Has an order been entered sealing all or any portion of the record? No.

5.

Is a reporter's transcript requested? Yes. It has already been prepared for the
appeal to the District Court.

6.

The Appellant requests the following documents to be included or excluded in
the clerk's record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28,
I.A.R.: Court orders regarding custody, visitation and child support do not
need to be included in the clerk's record.

7.

Icertify:

NOTICE OF APPEAL -2

a. That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on the reporter.
However, the reporter's transcript has already been prepared for the prior
appeal to the District Court.
b. That the clerk of the district court has not been paid the estimated fee for
preparation of the reporter's transcript because a transcript has already
been prepared.
c. That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid.
d. That the appellate f iling fee has been paid.
e. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served
pursuant to Rule 20.

NOTICE OF APPEAL -3

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I do hereby certify that on this 8thday of October, 2008, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing was served upon the following party as indicated:
Aaron Woolf, Esq.
Thompson, Smith, Woolf & Anderson, PLLC
3480 Merlin Drive
P.O. Box 50160
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0160
[ ]HAND DELIVERY

[X]U.S. MAIL
[ ]FAX NO

NOTICE OF APPEAL -4
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GREGORY PAUL BARRETT,
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE
OF APPEAL

\
I

1
1

VS.

ANNE MARIE BARRETT,

Appeal from:

1

Case No. CV-2005-4852
~ o c k eNO.
t

357 b

Seventh Judicial District, Bonneville County

Honorable Jon J. Shindurling, District Judge, presiding.
Case number fro111 Court:

CV-2005-4852

Order or Judgment appealed from: Opinion and Decision on Appeal, entered 8-29-08
Attorney for Appellant:

Royce B. Lee

Attorney for Respondent:

Aaron Woolf

Appealed by:

Plaintiff

Appealed against:

Defendant

Notice of Appeal Filed:

10-8-08

Appellate Fee Paid:

Yes

Was District Court Reporter's Transcript requested?

Yes

If so, name of reporter:

Nancy Marlow

Dated: October 14, 2008
RONALD LONGMORE

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL - 1

AARON J. WOOLF
ldaho State Bar #5791
THOMPSON SMITH WOOLF & ANDERSON, PLLC
3480 Merlin Drive
P.O. Box 50160
ldaho Falls, ID 83405
Telephone (208) 525-8792
Fax (208) 525-5266
Attorney for DefendantIAppellant, Ann Barrett.
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
GREGORY PAUL BARRETT,
Plaintiff,
vs .
ANN MARIE BARRETT,

)
)

)
)

1

Case No. CV-05-4852
AMENDED RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

Defendant
COMES NOW, Defendant, Ann Marie Barrett, by and through her attorney of
record, Aaron J. Woolf, Esq., of the law firm of THOMPSON SMITH WOOLF &
ANDERSON, PLLC, and hereby files this amended response to Plaintiff's Motion for
Reconsideration, which was filed on or about October 3, 2008, as follows:
1.

Ann is in complete agreement that the 278 N. Contour property should be

treated identically to the Etna, Wyoming property. Thus, Ann is in agreement with the
278 N. Contor property being classified as Greg's separate property.

2.

The parties' stipulated that if the Court found that the real property and

mobile home at 278 N. Contor, to be Greg's separate property, then Greg's separate

property interest would be 22.04% (see the attached Exhibit " A for a copy of the
transcript from trial) of the equity and the community property interest would be 77.06%
interest of the equity. At the time of trial, the parties stipulated that the value of the
mobile home and real property was $67,000.00 (see Defendant's Exhibit "M").
Furthermore, the debt owed to Wells Fargo, which was secured by the real property
and mobile home was $40,165.85 (see Plaintiff's Exhibit "26"). Thus, the total equity in
the real property and mobile home is $26,834.15. Pursuant to the stipulation of the
parties, Greg's separate property interest in said equity is $6,010.85 ($67,000 $40,165.85 X 22.04%), and the community property interest, which should be awarded
to Greg, is $20,823.30 ($67,000 - $40,165.85 X 22.04%).
3.

In the Court's Judgment and Order on All Remaining Issues (Property and

Debt Division and Attorneys Fees), entered September 11, 2007, Greg received the
278 N. Contor property as community property, with a net equity of $26,834.15. He will
continue to receive said property, but his community interest should now be listed at
$20,823.60, for a difference of $6,011.00.
4.

Based upon the above, Ann would owe Greg an additional $3,005.50 in

regard to the ultimate equalization payment, and this should be considered in Ann's
Motion to Determine Final Equalization Payment.
DATED this a d a y of October, 2008.

AMENDED RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RE

-2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVlCE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am a licensed attorney in ldaho, with my office in ldaho
Falls, and that on the z d a y of October, 2008. 1 served a true and correct copy of the
following-described document on the parties listed below, by mailing or by facsimile, with
the correct postage thereon, or by causing the same to be hand delivered
DOCUMENT SERVED:

Royce Lee, Esq.
Attorney at Law
770 S. Woodruff
ldaho Falls. ID 83401
Fax: (208) 524-2051

AMENDED RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
ailed El Hand Delivered CI Fax

AMENDED RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

-
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1

!

I Commerce referring to the Ca.
I

2

3

purchasing this Cavco mobile home?

A. I beli:

2

s

. ...

-

2s.

MR. LEE: Move to introduce Exhibit 10.

3

MR. WOOLF: No objection.
THE COURT: Ten is admitted.

4

A

Ibeiieve so.

4

5

Q

Who signed tile loan documents?

5

6

A

I t says Greg Barrett and Ann Barrett.

6

7

Q

Are these documents correct records reiating to

7

looks like your loan was already in piace before you

8

did the QuiL Claiiii Deed, is t i ~ a tiiow you I-emeli~beri t ?

8
9

(

1

,Ie home as
Note you took out in

security. I s this the Promissot

-

the Cavco mobile home?
A

MR. LEE: I move to introduce Exhibit No. 9

10

I1

I believe tiley are, yes.

( ~ l a i n t i i i ' sExhibit No. 10 admitted.)
Q

9

A

10

Q

11

into evidence.

(By Mr. Lee) Now, your loan was already

-- i t

(No response.)
Weil, I ' m not sure, we'li come back to that.
So when you p u t Ann's name on this Quit Claim

12

MR. WOOLF: No objection.

12

Deed you had already declared the m o b ~ l ehome to be

13

THE COURT: Nine is admitted then.
(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 9 admitted.)

13

reai properly?

q 4 .

14

(Discussion heid off the record.)

That's correct.

Q

And so by putting Ann's name on the Quit Claim

Deed, what was your understanding of what happened a:

(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1 0 marked.)
Q

A

a result?

(By Mr. Lee) Greg, I ' d like to show you

A

Exhibit No. 10.

That made Ann a part owner of the home and the

Okay.

lot and all the property connected together.

Q

What is that documerit?

A

This is a Quit Claim Deed.

Q D o you remember you and Ann talking about this
question, what i t means to p u t her name on the Quit

A

Q Who is it from and who Is it to?
A GI-eg Barrett to Greg and Ann Darrett.

Claim Deed?

Q

property and we were going to have It in both names.

A

What property has been conveyed by this Quit

I t was j u s t t h a t we were going to refinance the

I was giving i t to lher.

Claim Deed?

184
1

Q

Did you and she talk about that?

Fails, Idaho, 83401, Bonnevilie County.

2

A

Maybe briefly.

Q And is this recorded i n the Bonneville County
records?

Q

Do you recail any specific conversations

4

A

A

The property a t 278 North Contor Avenue, Idaho

3

5

Yes.

Q And is that your signature on there?
A Yes, i t is.
Q Does this relate to the same property where the

Ijust know t h a t we were going Lo do it and we

were going t o refinance the whole property and Ann's

7

name was going to be on it.

a

Q

So what was your interpretation of the legal

effect of putting her name on that paper?

Yes.

A

She was now part owner of the property.

Q

And what part is hers?
Ail. It's all of it, she's part owner of all

Q So this one is dated December 23rd and a loan
was - - your loan was dated November 29th and this was

A

dated December 23rd. After your loan was I n place you

of it.

signed a Quit Claim Deed putting Ann's name on the

Q

And equal owner with you?

ownership?

A

Oh, yes.

A

-:

Q As community property and sucii?
A Yes, that's correct.

That's what w e did, yes.
Q Can you teil us the circumstances around this
Quit Claim Deed?
19

A

--

6

Cavco mobiie home is located?
A

between you and Ann when you did this

MR. LEE: And, Your Honor, for the record
19

aqree on the price and there is a reference on Exhibit

company wanted i t to be real property, is that the

20

A about how that price is actualiy divided up if need

21

term,.instead of personal property, and so we changed

21

be based on some additional testimony, That's i n the

22

it over and made it real property and p u t i t i n both

22

other explanation column over here.

23
24

names.

23

25

of t h a t Qiiit Claim Deed?

20

A

Q

We wanted to do a refinance and the mortgage

I s tl?is Exhibit No. 1 0 a true and correct copy

4

(.,. ,24
Li, 25
'

MR. WOOLF: So it's m y understanding that if
the court finds t h a t the land is Greg's separate
property, then his separate property portion of t h e

I

--

...-

1

equity ;vouid be 22.4 percent. r o

?

1

MR. LEE: Correct.

/
1/

:

A

MR. WOOLF: And if he finds t h a t it's community

3

property; cc '5

4

property it's immaterial. So essentiaiiy w e agree

s

that i f the Court finds Greg has a separate property

/
/

Q
4

item
MR. WOOLF: And for the record, Your Honor,

5

interest i n the reai property that it would b e 22.4

t h e r e i s a stipuiation f r o m our standpoint regarding

percent.
TliE COURT: Thel-e's a stipulation to that

the vaiue a t $67,000 and that it is community

effect; I-ight?
MR. LEE: Yes.

t weii.
written slipuiation filed with tiie ~ o i r r as
MR.LEE: Okay. Good.

property, and that stipulation is contained ill tlie

MR. WOOLF: The only dispute is who receives

MR. WOOLF: Yes.

this property.
THE COURT: Okay.

THE COURT: I ' m sorry, how much o f this is
stipulation wliere she says in her comments $52,000

MR. WOOLF: I s t h a t right, Royce?

represents tlie vaiue of the mobiie home, $15,000
represents the value of the land? Did the parties
agree on that?
MR. WOOLF: Yes, for that

-- those

MR. LEE: That's correct.

Q (By Mr. Lee) So tell us your position o n who
should receive the property a t 140 North Adam.
A I ' m just going to b e frank and say it's

are In the

stipulations as weii.
MR. LEE: Right. For tlieir values we agree.

entirely u p to tlie Judge to decide whicli way i t goes.

THE COURT: So then the dispute is with regard

Either way is okay with me.

t o whether -- now let's see. Sorry. How much of
the -- sorry, how. m u c h of the $67,000 is community

Q

Q And does that depend somewhat on how the resi

MR. LEE: That is t h e dispute. And I have t o

o f the property settles out?
188

say t h e entry o n Exhibit A under t h e husband's column
186
2

where it. says Plaintiff agrees with t h e above, that's

I

A

That is correct.

not quite correct.

2

Q

Right now who iives at this property?

3

A

Arin does.

3

[?is.;
.,:

$3:

1;
.

";

All right. Tliey either get $67,000 worth of

property o r $67,000 w o r t h of credit o n something else
A I ' d be happy either way, siire.

pl-operty and how m u c h is separate property?

1

Yes.
So teii us your position o n who should get this

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. LEE: We need to probably cancel that out.

4

THE COURT: All right.

5

MR.'LEE: So the dispute is whether it became

6

Ann and her three children and the t w o boys
then are living here a t the present time?
Q

7
8

community property o r not.
MR. WOOLF: And if It didn't, then Greg's

7
8

That's correct.
Q Let's move u p to the next line where we talk
about Katie Court. Has there been a recent sale of

9

separate property portion of the equity would be 22.4

9

that property?

6

10

*,.. 12

13

lo

percent.

11

II

MR. LEE: Correct.

12
(By Mr. Lee) So I ' m going to move u p o u r
Exhibit No. 7 one more line and we arrive at 140 North 13

Q

,a

14

l o t and a doubie-wide mobile

15
16

A

Yes, that's correct.
Q And that, for t h e record, o n Defendant's
o. 5. I t appears we have a

17
18

value at $67,000. Do you feei
colnfortabiewith that price?
a difference of opinion about who

gree that it's community

r.17

,.

187
Page 186

Yes.
THE COURT: j u s t a second. 6 8 1 Katie Court,

there it is. Ali righty. Now wait a minute.
MR. LEE: Ishould have e-mailed my extra
property list.
THE COURT: The property

-

were just talking

about was - MR. LEE: 140 North Adam.
THE COURT: -- 1 4 0 North Adarn and Iput m y
notes under 1 8 1 North Adam. All right. Let m e move

20

thein. All righty. Sorry. Now we're on 681'Katie

21

Court. The way y o u ' r e throwing m e here is you're

22

going u p t h e list instead of down t h e list.

i 24

your position is o n w h o should get

A

19

23

Each o f you are asking for tlils

A

2 5

MR. LEE: Iknow. I shouldn't have done that,
Iknow.
Q (By Mr. Lee) Ail right. Let's talk about 6 8 1

Royce B. Lee, P.A.
Attorney at Law
770 South Woodruff Avenue
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83401
Telephone: (208)524-2652
Facsimile: (208)524-2051
Idaho State Bar #I691
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
GREGORY PAUL BARRETT,

)
)

Case No. CV-05-4852

1

Plaintiff/Appellant,

)

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL

ANN MARIE BARRETT,

TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, ANN MARIE BARRETT, AND THE
PARTY'S ATTORNEY, AARON WOOLF OF THOMPSON, SMITH, WOOLF &
ANDERSON, PLLC, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:

1.

The above named Appellant, Gregory Paul Barrett, appeals against the above
named Respondent, Ann Marie Barrett, to the Idaho Supreme Court from the
Opinion and Decision on Appeal entered in the above entitled action on the

2gthday of August, 2008, the Honorable Judge Shindurling presiding.

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL- -1

JR?"

2.

That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the
judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders
under and pursuant to Rule 11(a)(2),I.A.R.

3.

A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the appellant then
intends to assert in the appeal; provided, any such list of issues on appeal
shall not prevent the Appellant from asserting other issues on appeal:
a. Whether the District Court Judge on appeal erred by remanding the case
to the trial court with instructions to consider par01 evidence on whether a
Quitclaim Deed, by Ann Barrett of her separate property to Greg Barrett
and Ann Barrett as husband and wife, constituted a valid transmutation of
her property to community property.

4.

Has an order been entered sealing all or any portion of the record? No.

5.

Is a reporter's transcript requested? Yes. It has already been prepared for the
appeal to the District Court. It should be included as a part of the Clerk's
record.

6.

The Appellant requests the following documents to be included or excluded in
the clerk's record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28,
I.A.R.: Court orders regarding custody, visitation and child supportdo not
need to be included in the clerk's record.

7.

Only the following exhibits should be included in the Clerk's record. Such are
the exhibits which relate to the issue on appeal.

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL -2

28J-

Plaintiff's Exhibit.Numbers - 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19,

Defendant's Exhibit Numbers -A, B, C, D, E, F, G , H, I, J, K, L, M, P.

8.

Only the following pleadings should be included in the Clerk's record as they
are the only pleadings which relate to the issue on appeal

a< Verified Complaint for Dissolution of Marriage 8/29/05
.k Verified Counterclaim for Dissolution of Marriage 9/14/05
K Answer 9/14/05
MAnswer to Counterclaim 9/16/05
sd Stipulation
,fY Minutes Report of Court Trial, June 18 to June 22, 2007
3..Decree of Divorce 7/03/07
h-rDefendant's P roposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 7130107
i: Plaintiff's Post Trial Memorandum 7/31/07
j: Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Property and Debt Division
and Attorney Fees 9/11/07
k.Judgment and Order on All Remaining Issues (Property and Debt Division
and Attorney's Fees) 911 1/07
d" Notice of Appeal to District Court 9/14/07
x r x Defendant's Brief on Appeal 5/14/08
P laintiff's Brief on Appeal 6/12/08
.aMinute Entry on Oral Argument on Issues of Appeal 7/08/08
-Opinion and Decision on Appeal 8/29/08
to additional Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Property and Debt
Division Following Remand 9/17/08
-r-r Motion to Reconsider 9/23/08
s/ Notice of Appeal to Supreme Cpurt 10/08/08
i.r Clerk's Certificate of Appeal 16/16/08
9.

1 certify:
a. That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on the reporter.

However, the reporter's transcript has already been prepared for the prior

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL -3

2s-b

appeal to the District Court. The reporter's transcript should be included as
a support exhibit of the Clerk's record.
b. That the clerk of the district court has not been paid the estimated fee for
preparation of the reporter's transcript because a transcript has already
been prepared.
c. That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid.
d. That the appellate filing fee has been paid.
e. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served
;ua t to Rule 20.

4f3

DATED this

3day of

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL -4

2

~

7

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I do hereby certify that on this ~ 3 0day
' ~of October, 2008, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing was served upon the following party as indicated:
Aaron Woolf, Esq.
Thompson, Smith, Woolf & Anderson. PLLC
3480 Merlin Drive
P.O. Box 50160
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0160
[ ]HAND DELIVERY

[X]U.S.MAIL
[ ]FAX NO

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL -5
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BONNEVIELE COUNTY ,
GREGORY PAUL BARRETT,
Plaintiff,
vs .

ANN MAME BARRETT,
Defendant.

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Case No. CV-05-4852
ORDER WITHDRAWING
"ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW ON PROPERTY
AND DEBT DIVISION
FOLLOWING REMAND"

Upon further inspection of the court's file, it appears that the District Court did not
issue a remittitur pursuant to I.R.C.P. 83(z)(2)(A) and that the plaintiff timely filed a
Notice of Appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court: from the District Court's August 29: 2008
Opinion and Decision on Appeal. Accordingly, this court should not have entered its
September 17, 2008 "Additional Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Property
and Debt Division Following Remand" and now withdraws the same.
Dated November 5, 2008.

ORDER WITHDRAWING ADDITIONAL
CONCLUSIONS FOLLOWING REMAND

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

2

I certify that on the
day of November 2008,I served a true and correct copy
ofthe foregoing document on the persons listed below by mailing, with the correct
postage thereon, by facsimile, or by causing the same to be hand delivered.

Aaron J. Woolf
P.O. Box 50160
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
FAX (208) 524-545 1

~ u r t l r t h o u s eBox

Royce B. Lee
770 South Woodruff Avenue
Idaho Falls, ID 83401
FAX (208) 524-2051

6 u r t h o u s e Box

FAX

FAX

ORDER WITHDRAWING ADDITIONAL FINDINF$fj
CONCLUSIONS FOLLOWING REMAND
Bw

US Mail
Hand Delivery

0US Mail
Hand Delivery

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF RONNEVILLE
GREGORY PAUL BARRETT,
PlaintiffiAppella~it,
VS.

1

AMENDED

)

1

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE
OF APPEAL

1

Case No. CV-2005-4852

)

ANNE MARIE BARRETT,

Appeal from:

1

Docket No.

Seventh Judicial District, Bonlleville County

Honorable Jon J. Shindurling, District Judge, presiding.
Case nulnber from Court:

CV-2005-4852

Order or Judgment appealed frorn: Opiflion and Decision on Appeal, entered 8-29-08
Attorney for Appellant:

Royce B. Lee

Attorney for Respondent:

Aaron Woolf

Appealed by:

Plaintiff

Appealed against:

Defendant

Notice of Appeal Filed:

10-8-08

Appellate Fee Paid:

Yes

Was District Court Reporter's Transcript requested?

Yes

If so, name of reporter:

Nancy Marlow

Dated. November 18, 2008
RONALD LONGMORE
Clerk of the District Court
B y p 6 '
eputy Clerk

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL - 1

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
GREGORY PAUL BARRETT,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
VS.

ANNE MARIE BARRETT,

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Bonneville

)
)

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

)

Case No. CV-2005-4852

1
1

Docket No. 35763

1
1

1
1
1

I, Ronald Longnlore, Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State of
Idaho, in and for the County of Bonneville, do liereby certify that the above and foregoing Record in tlie
above-entitled cause was conipiled and bound under my direction and is a true, correct and complete
Record of the pleadings and documents as are auto~naticallyrequired under Rule 28 of the Idaho
Appellate Rules.

I do further certify that only tlie exhibits requested, in the above-entitled cause, will be duly
lodged with tlie Clerk of the Supreme Court along with the Court Reporter's Transcript (if requested) and
Clerk's Record, tlie followi~igis a list ofrequested exhibits.:
Transcripts:
Volulne I (~~~
Volume I1
Plaintiffs Exhibits:
7. Real Property List
8. Loan Payoff
9. 24x 48 Mobile Home
10. Quit Clairn Deed-Contor
11. Katie Ct. Loall Docs
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE - 1

12. Tennis Ct. SaleDocs
13. Tennis Ct. Deed
14. Loan Doc- Tennis Ct.
15. Payments-Tennis Ct.
16. Katie Ct. Proceeds
17. Warranty Deed-Tennis Ct.
18. Warranty Deed-Etna
19. Spencer Divorce Decree
20. Quit Claim-Etna
22. Closing Stunt-Etna
23. Quit Claim-Etna
24. Promissory Note-Etna
25. Mortgage-Etna
26. Debt List
27. Purch Agnnt-Etna
28. Warranty Deeds-Etna
29. Subdivision-Etna
30. Develop Status Ernail
3 1. Def s Trust Act Stmt
32. Appraisal-Etna
33. Access Change Permit
34. Access Change Appl
Defendant's Exhibit:
A. Cornbilled Property List
B. Wrnty Deed-Lovelands
C. Loan Disclosure 8/12/99
D. Check-Country Wide 8/99
E. Pay-Off as of 7/22/07
F. Letter Dated 0/15105
G. Check from WY 100 LLC
H. Photos (hey 89 Gate)
I. Wrnty Deed Contor
J. Loan for Contor Prop
I<. Wells Fargo Loan Docs
L. Quit Claim Deed 11/23/07
M. Stipulation 6/15/07
P. Rental Income/Expense
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and aFfixed the seal of the said C o u ~this
t

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE - 2

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTI-I JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
GREGORY PAUL BARRETT,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
VS.

ANNE MARIE BARRETT,

)
)
)

1
1
)

CERTIFICATE
OF SERVICE
Case No. CV-2005-4852
Docltet No. 35763

1

DefendantlRespondent.

1

8
1 HEREBY CERTIFY that 011 the %day

of December, 2008,I served a copy of the Repo~ter's

Transcript (if requested) and the Clerk's Record in the Appeal to the Supreme Court in the above entitled
cause upon the following attorneys:
Royce B. Lee, Esq.
770 S Woodruff Avenue
Idaho Falls, ID 83401

Anovney for AppeNan!

Aaron J. Woolf, Esq.
P.O. Box
Idaho Falls, ID. 83405

Attovneyfor Respondent

by depositing a copy of each thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid, in an ellvelope addressed
to said attorneys at the foregoing address, whicb is the last address of said attorneys known to tne.
RONALD LONGMORE

CERTlFICATE OF SERVICE - 1

AARON J. WOOLF
ldaho State Bar #5791
THOMPSON SMITH WOOLF & ANDERSON, PLLC
3480 Merlin Drive
P.O. Box 50160
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
Teleohone (208) 525-8792
Fax i208) 525-5266
Attorney for Respondent, Ann Barrett
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
GREGORY PAUL BARRETT,
Plaintiff,
vs .
ANN MARIE BARRETT,
Defendant

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-05-4852
ORDER

)

BASED UPON the Stipulation entered into between Plaintiff and Defendant, by
and through their respective attorneys of record, and good cause appearing therefore;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the following documents shall be added to the
Clerk's Record on Appeal:
a. Defendant's Reply Brief on Appeal which was filed on or about June 30,

b. Plaintiff's exhibit 21.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the hearing currently scheduled for February 2,
2009 is vacated.

DATED this

A

7

day of February, 009

NOTICE OF ENTRY
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing was on the

1
day of

February, 2009, provided to every party affected thereby, as follows:
Mailed 'ti3 Hand Delivered U Fax

Aaron J. Woolf, Esq.
Thompson Smith Woolf & Anderson, PLLC
3480 Merlin Drive
P.O. Box 50160
ldaho Falls, ldaho 83405
Fax (208) 525-5266
Royce Lee, Esq.
Attorney at Law
770 S. Woodruff
ldaho Falls, ID 83401
Fax: (208) 524-2051

Mailed

2

Deputy

ORDER

hd

Hand Delivered

. Ida

Fax

